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REBUILDING THE PuBLIC-PRIVATE CITY: REGULATORY 
TAKING'S ANTI-SUBORDINATION INSIGHTS FOR 
EMINENT DOMAIN AND REDEVELOPMENT 
AUDREY G. McFARLANE' 
ABSTRACf 
The eminent domain debate, steeped in the language of property rights, 
currently lacks language and conceptual space to address what is really 
at issue in today' s cities: complex, fundamental disagreements between 
market and community about development. The core doctrinal issue 
presented by development is how can we acknowledge the subordination 
of citizens who happen to live in areas that are attractive to wealthier 
citizens. In particular, how should we address the political process 
failure reflected in the privatized methods of decisionmaking that typify 
redevelopment? The conceptual language and analytical construct for 
appropriately addressing these issues come from critical race theory and 
its project of anti-subordination. The doctrinal model for resolving 
urban development disagreement comes from the anti-subordination 
principles reflected in regulatory takings doctrine. This Article argues 
that regulatory takings doctrine reflects one of the most developed, yet 
underappreciated, anti-subordination doctrines in the law. Both takings 
and critical race theory provide a template for properly focusing on ways 
to improve the lack of public accountability in development and the 
unresponsiveness of eminent domain doctrine to commonly accepted 
notions of fairness as a component of the public good. 
"They don't know I got a[n] [eminent domain] clause of my own . ... 
They can carry me out feet first . .. but my clause say . .. they got to 
meet my price!'" 
-Memphis Lee, Two Trains Running 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. This Article was made 
possible by the generous research support of the University of Baltimore Law School. Thanks to 
Ray Dubicki and Oyinade Koya for able research assistance. Additionally, thank you to the 
following people who generously read earlier drafts and offered comments: Michele Alexandre, 
Taunya Banks, Patience Crowder, Gerald Frug, Cassandra Jones Havard, Odeana Neal, Catherine 
Smith, Terry Smith, John V. White. 
l. AUGUST WILSON, Two TRAINs RUNNING act I, sc. 3 (1992) (statement of "greasy spoon" 
proprietor Memphis Lee). See Frank Rich, Two Trains Running; August Wilson Reaches the 60's 
With Witnesses From a Distance, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr. 14, 1992, at C13 (Lee who "is negotiating a 
price for the city's demolition of his restaurant, is confident he can beat the white man at his own 
game as long as he knows the rules"). 
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INTRODUCTION 
With the failed challenge to the exercise of eminent domain in Kelo v. City 
of New London,2 the state of eminent domain constitutional doctrine continues 
to be highly deferential to states and local government. For some reason, the 
popular objection to the sanction of economic development as an acceptable 
constitutional justification did not translate within the confines of eminent 
domain jurisprudence. The unresponsiveness of federal constitutional doctrine 
might be due to the ways that the challenge is typically framed. Objections are 
framed in highly individualized terms as issues of private property rights, 
discussed entirely along the axis of the public/private distinction.3 These 
public/private arguments demanded that the Court attempt to draw what would 
likely be un administrable hard lines between valid and invalid purposes. 
The overall eminent domain debate pits two types of concerns against each 
other in a dialogue that speaks past the other in different languages. At the core 
of the opposition are earnest and deeply held beliefs about individual property 
rights: claims to reliance and expectation interests that must be protected against 
governmental decisions. These emotionally charged arguments typically reflect 
outrage over the perceived violation of fundamental guarantees of free choice, 
control over unwanted change, and against uncertainty.4 Powerlessness in the 
face of change is part of the human condition, but legal doctrinal powerlessness 
in the face of human-initiated change is profoundly different; it suggests a 
frustrating lack of agency in the face of unfair governmental decisionmaking, 
which has the legitimizing imprimatur of democracy. 
2. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
3. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, The PubliC/Private Distinction and Constitutional Limits on 
Private Power, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 361, 363-64 (1993) (evaluating the criticism of the public-
private distinction that "state action ... [is] ubiquitous" in a system oflaws); Gerald Turkel, The 
PubliC/Private Distinction: Approaches to the Critique of Legal Ideology, 22 LAW & SOC'y REv. 
801, 812-13 (1988) (arguing that treating the public-private distinction as a relative concept saves 
it from incoherency by a continuum of images "ultimately, rooted in imagery from the past: 'The 
distinction is dead, but it rules us from the grave. "'); Joan Williams, The Development of the 
PubliC/Private Distinction in American Law, 64 TEx. L. REv. 225, 226 (1985) (book review) 
("Doctrines that incorporate the public/private distinction include the principles that localities may 
issue bonds only for 'public purposes' and may be sued for torts committed in their private 
(proprietary) but not their public (governmental) capacity; that the government may take land in 
eminent domain only for 'public uses."') (citations omitted). 
4. See Kristi M. Burkard, No More Government Theft of Property! A Call to Return to a 
Heightened Standard of Review After the United States Supreme Coun Decision in Kelo v. City 
of New London, 27 HAMLINE J. PuB. L. & POL'y 115 (2005); Gideon Kanner, The Public Use 
Clause: Constitutional Mandate or "Honatory Fluff"?, 33 PEPP. L. REv. 335 (2006); Brent 
Nicholson & Sue Ann Mota, From Public Use to Public Purpose: The Supreme Coun Stretches 
the Takings Clause in Kelo v. City of New London, 41 GoNZ.L. REv. 81 (2005); Sonya D. Jones, 
Note, That Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My Land . .. Until the Local Government Can Tum 
Itfor a Profit: A Critical Analysis ofKelo v. City of New London, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 139 (2005). 
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Arguments by urban development proponents of eminent domain are rational 
in defense of the need for both growth and change to reverse or avert urban 
decline.5 At the core of these arguments is a communitarian-like defense of the 
need for eminent domain: use "change" as a route to progress and urban 
economic health.6 That such change and growth may come at the expense of a 
few is a price worth paying in order to protect and promote the interests of the 
general good of the local polity. 
Currently, there is no conceptual space or language in this property versus 
community debate to meaningfully acknowledge and address what is really at 
issue in today' s cities: complex, fundamental disagreements between market and 
community about development, economic growth, prosperity, and communal 
needs. The overarching question fueling the eminent domain issue is, can, and 
should, legal doctrine address the structural shift and current biases of the global 
economy? Market demand, fueled by globalization, weighs the interests of 
wealth more than the disaggregated claims of property rights presented by 
residents (either tenants or owners). This results in types, locations, and methods 
of development that are subordinating. An unanswered economic question about 
eminent domain is how the globalized economy affects or controls local 
government's need to work to further local economic development. Are there so 
few choices left after globalization that the current approaches to economic 
development are inevitable?7 
Doctrinally, the specific issue is how to address the subordination of citizens 
who happen to live in areas that are now attractive to wealthier citizens. We have 
not grappled with subordination resulting from the state and local political 
process. This subordination is reflected in the privatized method of 
decisionmaking that typifies redevelopment. Redevelopment's improvements 
most often come at the expense of a consistent few types of persons: poor, 
working class people; however, there is an increasing effect on middle-class 
residents. 
The conceptual language and analytical construct for addressing these issues 
come from critical race theory. Race, class, and wealth have long been at the 
5. See, e.g., Brief for the American Planning Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166929; 
Daniel H. Cole, Why Kelo Is Not Good Newsfor Local Planners and Developers, 22 GA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 803 (2006); Asmara Tekle Johnson, Privatizing Eminent Domain: The Delegation of a Very 
Public Power to Private, Non-Profit and Charitable Corporations, 56 AM. U. L. REv. 455 (2007); 
Marc B. Mihaly, Living in the Past: The Kelo Court and Public-Private Economic Redevelopment, 
34 EcoWGY L.Q. I (2007). 
6. See Cole, supra note 5, at 824 (noting that main supporters of the eminent domain power 
are "local government groups, such as the National League of Cities, city planners, and 
developers"). 
7. A growing body of literature suggests that globalization need not have taken either the 
shape or the pace that it has in the United States. See, e.g., William Sites, Primitive Globalization? 
State and Locale in Neoliberal Global Engagement, 18 Soc. THEORY 121, 125 (2000) (arguing that 
different nations understand and have responded to globalization differently). 
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heart of the claim against eminent domain. The debate over eminent domain is 
inadequately acknowledged as a geographically and racially identified debate 
over development now being fueled by globalization. Prior to Kelo v. City of 
New London,s eminent domain and redevelopment was largely a Black and urban 
phenomenon. The introductory epigraph quotes Memphis Lee, a character in an 
August Wilson play, and illustrates that eminent domain and redevelopment have 
been such a part of the Black American experience that it makes an appropriate 
plot. The perceived need to improve dilapidated, underserved, economically 
disconnected communities has been primarily located in poor or working-class, 
Black neighborhoods in the inner city. As demonstrated by the massive 
disruptions of community resulting from poorly conceived and poorly executed 
redevelopment schemes during the urban renewal era, the oppression of the 
"blight" designation predates Kelo, yet has long been accepted as part of the 
normal terrain of the urban landscape. Kelo, however, geographically decoupled 
eminent domain from the inner city and made clear that the power could 
potentially be exercised anywhere, even outside of the Black inner cities.9 By 
clarifying that "economic development" now permits property and communities 
to theoretically be taken and remade anywhere, the oppressive aspects of the 
broad term "development" is now receiving long overdue attention. 10 
The purpose of this Article is to bridge the language gap in the eminent 
domain discourse by translating the property rights language into the anti-
subordination language of critical race theory. The best legal doctrinal model for 
resolving these urban development disagreements comes from the suburbs, 11 
from the anti-subordination principles reflected in regulatory takings doctrine. 12 
8. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
9. This point was presaged by Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 242 
(1984), where the eminent domain context was outside the inner city and focused on remedying a 
problem of oligopoly and concentration of land ownership. 
10. The perception that the doctrine has shifted geographically has led to an alliance between 
otherwise strange bedfellows. Conservative property rights groups, small business owners, 
communitarians, and the NAACP have all united to oppose eminent domain. See Abraham Bell 
& Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L. REv. 1412,1418 (2006) 
('The case united, if only for a short while, such unlikely allies as the Institute for Justice, the 
NAACP, Richard Epstein, and Amitai Etzioni, all of whom opposed the planned taking.") 
(footnotes omitted). 
11. Regulatory takings doctrine arises mainly from development controversies in suburban 
and rural settings. Though exercises of eminent domain have largely been confined to urban 
settings, they are increasingly occurring in inner-ring suburbs. See Wendell E. Prichett, Beyond 
Kelo: Thinking About Urban Development in the 21st Century, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 895, 914 
(2006) (arguing that the Kelo controversy reflects the move of the use of eminent domain to 
suburban locations). 
12. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 
(2002). Although Tahoe-Sierra ostensibly stands for a very deferential standard for local 
government, which most experts agree means that the vast majority of takings challenges will fail 
under federal constitutional grounds, takings doctrine, nevertheless, illustrates what courts have 
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Because regulatory takings doctrine reflects one of the most developed, yet 
underappreciated, anti-subordination doctrines in the law, it provides a template 
for properly focusing on ways to improve the lack of public accountability and 
increase development's responsiveness to commonly accepted notions of public 
good. Financially compensated urban eminent domain condemnations and 
financially uncompensated exercises of suburban regulatory power (through 
moratoria on development or development exactions) involve analogous 
discretionary decisionmaking. In regulatory takings doctrine, the Supreme Court 
is interested both in individual property rights and in protecting property owners 
as a group from the public enterprise of government and the public needs of the 
general welfare. 13 
The evolution of the ad hoc doctrine of regulatory takings reflects an 
imperfect, yet effective, attempt to insulate private property owners from the 
structural inequities of the political process. In such cases, the harms to a few, 
or to consistently disadvantaged groups that are unable to affect governmental 
decisionmaking, suggests a structural compromise of property rights. The 
doctrine's evolution includes attempts to harden property rights protections by 
intervening to protect property owners on principle. 14 This evolution suggests 
that regulatory takings is an anti-subordination doctrine. Thus, regulatory 
takings' anti-subordination logic allows us to account for the impact of eminent 
domain on property owners as well as on community. It allows us to move past 
focusing solely on the problems of the property owners to define the problem. 
We shift instead to a definition that encompasses the resident (whether owner or 
renter) and the small business person (a commercial resident), as well as the 
problems of low-wage workers who want to join in a community either as 
resident or laborer. 
Part I of this Article discusses the nature of development disagreements in 
cities and the problems in both the Kelo majority and dissenting opinions. I 
argue that deference to local government in determining public purpose makes 
sense, but fails to account for the subordination inherent in much redevelopment. 
I also argue that the test advanced by the Kelo dissent, which reflects the 
prevailing view in the United States as indicated by the flurry of state eminent 
domain legislation and some subsequent state court decisions, 15 is unduly narrow 
and unadministrable. The dissent's concern for the impact of eminent domain 
found most compelling to protect for property owners. See infra Part II.E. 
13. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 123-26 (1978) 
(discussing the important factors in regulatory takings jurisprudence). 
14. See, e.g., Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831 (1987) (adopting a 
categorical rule that a public easement was the equivalent of a permanent physical occupation and 
an invalid taking regardless ofthe impact on the market value of the land); Loretto v. Teleprompter 
Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (requiring tenants to receive cable was a taking 
because the presence of the cable wire on the property owner's building destroyed the right to 
exclude). 
15. See David A. Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor After 
Kelo, 101 Nw. U. L. REv. 365, 372-73 (2006). 
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approaches, but fails to fully adopt, an anti-subordination logic. I seek to expand 
upon these concerns by fully explicating the hidden and not-so-hidden 
subordination in redevelopment. 
Part II explores Fifth Amendment Takings rationale and its implicit Equal 
Protection concerns as ways to doctrinally frame the obligations of government 
to refrain from using its powers to subordinate certain citizens. Part II also 
discusses the relevance of development disagreements in the suburbs and the 
effort to define property rights to protect one's property in the face of great 
public desire to preserve nature. I trace the evolution of the reasoning of 
regulatory takings doctrine in particular and examine the Court's attentiveness 
in scrutinizing the nature of the harm suffered. The imperfect evolution of the 
doctrine's attempt to create hard and fast property-based protections against 
government decisionmaking has, at the very least, signaled to local governments 
that they should tread carefully when imposing anti-development regulation and 
individual interests are in conflict with great public need.16 The principles 
derived from regulatory takings suggest a "gut" fairness standard that must be 
applicable to disagreements over redevelopment. These disagreements manifest 
most often in disputes over the exercise of eminent domain. 
Part ill concludes by suggesting how critical race theory's anti-subordination 
principles might be applied in the context of a '''carefully considered' 
development plan."I? If the plan is to be a validating device for redevelopment, 
it must be formulated to ensure some likelihood that it reflects representative 
interests within the polity. 
I. DEVELOPMENT DISAGREEMENTS IN THE CITY 
A. The Supreme Court Majority's Embrace of Rational Deference 
1. in the Beginning: Berman v. Parker and Urban Renewal.-The Supreme 
Court's eminent domain jurisprudence illustrates the consistent, yet evolving, 
nature of disagreements over development in the cities. When the first 
redevelopment case of the modem era, Berman v. Parker,18 was decided, the 
motive for redevelopment was to offset the beginnings of urban decline by 
eliminating slums and redesigning the community according to the modem 
planning principles of the time. 19 The petitioners' arguments focused on the 
16. See Ann E. Carlson & Daniel Pollak:, Takings on the Ground: How the Supreme Court's 
Takings Jurisprudence Affects Local Land Use Decisions, 35 U.C. DAVIsL. REv. 103,116 (2001) 
(indicating that "California planners have a high awareness of the [U.S. Supreme Court Takings] 
cases"). 
17. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,478 (2005) (quoting Kelo v. City of New 
London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 (Conn. 2004». 
18. 348 U.S. 26 (1954). 
19. For an extensive discussion of the modernist planning principles and their impact on the 
urban renewal era, see Keith Aoki, Race, Space, and Place: The Relation Between Architectural 
Modernism, Post-Modernism, Urban Planning, and Gentrification, 20 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 699, 
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expansion of the redevelopment area beyond acknowledged slum areas and the 
insufficiency of the Redevelopment Authority's justifications for the plan. 
Petitioners argued their store was not properly characterized as blighted slum 
housing because general aesthetics was not a proper public purpose, and the 
transfer of the property from the Redevelopment Authority to private real estate 
developers was not a public use.20 These arguments continue to this day to 
encompass the core of the arguments against exercises of eminent domain for 
economic development.21 As illustrated by Keith Aoki's work, the development 
disagreement of the urban renewal era was the conflict between what was 
perceived to be modem and undesirably pre-modern.22 There was the sense of 
an inexorable need to progress and abandon the past in order to properly meet the 
future. More concretely, the city foresaw a need to modernize in order to 
survive, but residents felt the changes came at their expense. Even though 
redevelopment plans were allowed to encompass viable working neighborhoods, 
the Berman Court affirmed the propriety of eminent domain used for these 
purposes.23 The thought was that scientific excising of diseased or harmful areas 
needed to include adjacent unblighted land for a thorough, comprehensive 
redesign to prevent worsening conditions.24 The Court found that this strategy 
was necessary and appropriate so long as the government said it was.25 
2. The Difference Between Now and Then: Urban Renewal Versus 
Economic Development.-The objections raised in Berman are not dissimilar 
from today' s eminent domain objections. The redevelopment scenarios in each 
case, although separated by fifty-plus years and labeled differently, are quite 
similar. The concern in both New London and Southwest D.C. was, and is, to 
reverse decline and keep the cities viable.26 What has changed about today's 
767 (1993). 
20. Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. Of course, what took place after the decision was drastic, poorly 
planned clearance and demolition, not just of slums and dilapidated housing, but of thriving 
neighborhood commercial districts and residential areas. Entire communities were displaced 
throughout the United States, usually working-class, and Black. This gave urban renewal the bad 
name it still carries today. See MARTIN ANDERSON, THE FEDERAL BUllDOZER: A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS OF URBAN RENEWAL 1949-1962, at 8-9 (1964); JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF 
GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 5 (1961); Wendell E. Pritchett, The "Public Menace" of Blight: Urban 
Renewal and the Private Uses of Eminent Domain, 21 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 1,47 (2003). 
21. See, e.g., Kelo, 843 A.2d 500 (plaintiffs challenge whether economic development is a 
valid public use and whether the taking of plaintiffs' land was reasonably necessary to the 
development plan). 
22. See Aoki, supra note 19, at 765-73. 
23. Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 36. 
26. See Mihaly, supra note 5, at 4 (arguing that "[s]imple ignorance of the transformed and 
transforming nature of city-center land use development lies at the heart of the pervasive popular 
reaction to the Kelo decision. Americans enjoy the fruits of economic redevelopment .... They 
do not, however, understand how the transformation occurred"). Mihaly also argues that the Kelo 
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development disagreements, however, is the prevailing view of what needs to be 
done to keep cities viable in the twenty-first century. Dramatic changes have 
taken place in available types of employment; the opportunity for stable, well-
paid, self-directed work continues to decline.27 The gap continues to widen 
between the highly compensated and everyone else.28 Technology allows for 
sudden inflation and deflation of markets, economies, and currency through rapid 
global investment and disinvestment.29 These changes have been heightened by 
the United States' relatively rapid entry into liberalized markets and 
globalization.30 Thus, the problem is the same yet different. Adding the global 
dimensions of our collective exposure, and the city's exposure, to homogenizing 
market forces makes the already high stakes even higher. What is also different 
is that the underlying plan supporting the exercise of eminent domain in Kelo was 
openly conceived in tandem with, and designed to meet the specific needs of, a 
private corporation, Pfizer Pharmaceutical.3) The Berman question remains but 
is perhaps attenuated: what should a city like New London do to address dire 
economic conditions? In older, inner-ring suburbs that have lost their economic 
and social purpose, what can be done to address the reality of their decline?32 
In holding that economic development met the Fifth Amendment standard for 
public use by serving a valid public purpose,33 the Kelo majority opinion 
carefully navigated a minefield of problems and contradictions. The problems 
all concern identifying a principled line that distinguishes proper from improper 
takings. In particular, the overt privatization of the development process 
produces a great challenge to the underlying public rationale of eminent domain. 
In order to provide continued justification for a city's exercise of eminent 
domain, the Kelo opinion had to decide between the private impact on resistant 
property owners and the public welfare. Although the Court noted the deeply 
majority opinion follows Berman, but does not follow its pro-development stance. See id. at 59. 
27. See DAVID DOOlEY & JOANN PRAUSE, THE SOCIAL COSTS OF UNDEREMPLOYMENT: 
INADEQUATE EMPLOYMENT AS DISGUISED UNEMPLOYMENT 11-14 (2004) (discussing differing 
patterns of under-employment for men, women, and minorities). 
28. See Saskia Sassen, New Employment Regimes in Cities, in CITIES, ENTERPRISES AND 
SOCIETY ON THE EVE OF THE 21ST CENTURY 129, 136 (Frank Moulaert & Allen John Scott eds., 
1997) (noting a dualization in wages in information and knowledge-intensive service industry 
wages). 
29. See LARRY J. RAY, GLOBAUZATION AND EVERYDAY LIFE 66-67 (2007) (discussing the 
networks of trust and cultural practices that support rapid global capital flows). 
30. See Sites supra note 7, at 127. 
31. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477-78 (2005). 
32. See generally Mole Davis, Ozzie and Harriet in Hell: On the Decline of Inner Suburbs, 
in SPRAWL AND SUBURBIA 27 (William S. Sanders ed., 2005); WILUAM H. Lucy & DAVID L. 
PHIlLIPS, CONFRONTING SUBURBAN DECLINE: STRATEGIC PLANNING R>R METROPOUf AN RENEWAL 
18-19 (2000). 
33. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484 ("Because that plan unquestionably serves a public purpose, the 
takings challenged here satisfy the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment."). 
2009] REBUILDING THE PUBLIC-PRIVATE CITY 105 
held personal value placed on the property,34 the dashed feelings of the few were 
outweighed by the potential benefits to the many.35 By emphasizing the city's 
perspective, the majority opinion was able to consider the dire economic 
conditions in New London separate from the specific interests that different 
groups of citizens, particularly residents of the redevelopment area, might have 
had.36 
3. The Kelo Majority and Legitimizing the Privatized City as Public.-
Possibly the most difficult problem in crafting eminent domain doctrine is how 
to address the intertwined private-public nature of the redevelopment.37 If a city 
believes that it absolutely must facilitate private business, what happens to 
assumptions that cities are public and acting on behalf of the general welfare? 
Does the city, by working so closely with, and acting in the interests of, a private 
corporation, lose its public character? Who gets to formulate the answer? 
According to Kelo, the city and the state give the answer.38 According to both 
dissenting opinions, it is the courts who give the answer on behalf of property 
owners.39 Recall that the arguments presented centered on the transfer of the 
property to a private company to redevelop the property for its own private 
benefit.40 Because the Court has long-used a functional distinction to treat cities 
as having a public or private character,41 it is no longer sufficient for the City to 
formally, as a matter of its legally designated identity, be the City in order to be 
public and entitled to exercise eminent domain. The "public-ness" of the City is, 
in effect, a rebuttable presumption.42 Thus, the overall task for the Kelo majority 
opinion was to restore the City'S eroding public legitimacy. It attempted to do 
so first by resorting to legal formalism and finding that the first source of City 
power and legitimacy came from the State.43 This, of course, could not be the 
34. See id. at 475 (noting that Kelo had made extensive improvements to her house and 
valued it for its view). 
35. See Alberto B. Lopez, Weighing and Reweighing Eminent Domain's Political 
Philosophies Post-Kelo, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 237, 243-45 (2006) (discussing the competing 
influences of republicanism and liberalism in the logic and philosophy of eminent domain). 
36. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84. 
37. See CHRISTOPHER B. LEINBERGER, TuRNING AROUND DOWNTOWN: TwELVE STEPS TO 
REVITAUZATION 5 (Brookings Institution 2005) (describing today's approach to development as 
a "private/public partnership"). 
38. See Keio, 545 U.S. at 478. 
39. [d. at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting), 506 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
40. [d. at 485 ("Petitioners contend that using eminent domain for economic development 
impermissibly blurs the boundary between public and private takings. Again, our cases foreclose 
this objection. Quite simply, the government's pursuit of a public purpose will often benefit 
individual private parties."). 
41. See, e.g., Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. 
San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
42. See id. 
43. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 483-84 (noting that the City invoked a state statute specifically allowing 
eminent domain for economic development to effectuate its redevelopment plan). 
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sole detenninant of the sufficiency of the City's "publicness" because the 
authority derived from the State does not speak directly to the eminent domain 
objections. The main challenge to the City's public legitimacy stemmed from 
doubt about the City's public motivations and the certainty that they were 
pretextual because private interests were at the heart of the City's decisions.44 
The Court used the phrase purely private purpose as an example of potentially 
pretextual public purpose.45 A city having an actual purpose of bestowing a 
private benefit would supposedly be engaging in an arbitrary and capricious due 
process violation.46 
The other aspect of the city's eroding public legitimacy is the breadth of 
"economic development" as a justification. Many find economic development 
an unconvincing justification because anything can be justified as done in 
furtherance of economic development. Too often, the incremental, tertiary 
benefits of economic development are over-touted as real.47 The results of public 
subsidy, either through direct financial support or assistance of eminent domain 
for site assembly, are rarely scrutinized and promises for jobs are rarely 
enforced.48 
The next significant source for strengthening the City's public legitimacy in 
the majority opinion comes from the City's planning function: New London had 
exercised eminent domain in connection with a '''carefully considered' 
development plan."49 The plan itself was regarded as legitimate because the 
reality of dire conditions in the city demonstrated a need to improve economic 
conditions. New London had long slipped off the national economic radar and 
recently lost its naval installation. 50 The city was also designated by the State as 
a "distressed municipality" eligible for state financial assistance.51 From the 
44. [d. at 485. 
45. [d. at 477 (citing Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 245 (1984)). 
46. See id. at 478 n.5. 
47. See, e.g., Peter D. Enrich, Saving the States from Themselves: Commerce Clause 
Constraints on State Tax [ncentivesfor Business, 110 HARv. L. REv. 377,390-91 (1996). 
48. See Mark Richard Lindblad, Peiformance Measurement in Local Economic Development, 
41 URB. AFF. REv. 646,646 (2006) ("Despite the trend toward accountability in the public sector, 
little inferential research exists on the use of accountability tools ... in local economic development 
.... [I]n municipal policy making, both structural constraints and local choices matter, but local 
choices matter more."); see also JULIAN Goss ET AL., COMMUNITY BENEATS AGREEMENTS: 
MAKING DEVEWPMENT PROJECfS ACCOUNTABLE 21-22 (2005) (recommending ways to enforce 
local economic development agreements). 
49. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 478 (quoting Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 536 
(Conn. 2004)). 
50. [d. at 473 ("In 1996, the Federal Government closed the Naval Undersea Warfare Center, 
which had been located in the Fort Trumbull area of the City and had employed over 1,500 
people."). 
51. !d.; see CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 32-9(p) (West 2003) (defining distressed municipality, 
a term which arose from the federal Urban Development Action Grant (UDAG) program. 
Following termination of the UDAG program, the designation made the city eligible for state 
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majority's perspective, the validity of the City's purpose was ratified because it 
was part of a carefully considered plan of development, as well as by the 
traditional local and state activity of promoting economic development.52 Thus, 
the problem addressed sufficiently matched the stated purposes of the 
development plan. 
Curiously, the comprehensiveness of the development plan is also a 
legitimizing basis for the exercise of eminent domain. This is ironic because the 
underlying objection to the exercise of eminent domain often is to the 
comprehensiveness of the plan. While the Court acknowledged that the Pfizer 
and New London Development Corporation (NLDC) plans were connected, 
"local planners [by inference the NLDC] hoped that Pfizer would draw new 
business to the area, thereby serving as a catalyst to the area's rejuvenation,"53 
the Court found that the transfer was a method of development that was 
sufficiently public to meet the public use test.54 While seeking to convey a purely 
private benefit is never a valid goal,55 the existence of a plan that passed a 
rational relationship test ensures that the city never seriously encountered the 
problem of seeking to confer a private benefit.56 
The final source of City legitimacy was that economic development is a valid 
and traditional goal of state and local government.57 That is, seeking to attract 
or retain private companies is a legitimate government function.58 All that New 
London had chosen to do, with the hope of ensuring its financial survival and 
continued provision of services to its residents, was to capitalize on possibly one 
of its few assets-its waterfront. 
The City has carefully formulated an economic development plan that it 
believes will provide appreciable benefits to the community, 
including-but by no means limited to--new jobs and increased tax 
revenue. As with other exercises in urban planning and development, 
the City is endeavoring to coordinate a variety of commercial, 
residential, and recreational uses of land, with the hope that they will 
form a whole greater than the sum of its parts. 59 
Thus, facilitating private action by use of the eminent domain power to the 
financial assistance under Connecticut's Small Town Economic Assistance Program. See id.; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 4-66g (West 2007 & Supp. 2008). 
52. Keto, 545 U.S. at 478,484. 
53. [d. at 473. 
54. [d. at 483. 
55. [d. at 477. 
56. [d. at 490-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting there may be occasions where the 
plan is a sham). 
57. [d. at 484. 
58. [d. ("Promoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of 
government. There is, moreover, no principled way of distinguishing economic development from 
the other public purposes that we have recognized."). 
59. /d. at 483 (footnote omitted). 
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specific satisfaction of the private actors in return for the secondary and tertiary 
benefits of economic activity within the town's borders is valid.60 
The greatest justification for the Kelo majority opinion is the difficulty, if not 
near impossibility, of defining "bright line" rules for whether a taking is valid.61 
The Court, in effect, threw up its hands at the futility of determining a principled 
way to distinguish economic development from other recognized public 
purposes.62 The decision, however, is still deeply unsatisfying. Even if 
promoting economic development is a traditional, accepted function of 
govemment,63 something stillfeels wrong with the exercise of eminent domain. 
The source of the continued dissatisfaction with the Kelo majority opinion is the 
lack of focus on the harm from the forced sale to property owners who are 
commercial and residential occupants of a neighborhood.64 Even though the loss 
of the property's economic value is financially compensated, the compulsory 
aspect of the sale to the government and the loss of the ability to decide whether 
and when to sell are not compensated.65 
B. The Dissents-Anti-Subordination Obscured by Formalism in Search 
of a "Bright Line" Rule 
The Kelo dissenting opinions were most concerned with the plight of private 
property owners in this new world of economic development and their inability 
to protect themselves during the redevelopment process.66 According to the 
dissents, the Fifth Amendment's "public use" clause was intended as an anti-
private command that would serve the interests offaimess by allowing the Court 
to police "bright lines" of valid and invalid takings. Dissenting Justices 
O'Connor and Thomas relied on the "bright line" of requiring some form of 
60. See id. 
61. /d. ("For more than a century, our public use jurisprudence has wisely eschewed rigid 
formulas and intrusi ve scrutiny in favor of affording legislatures broad latitude in determining what 
public needs justify the use of the takings power. "). 
62. See id. at 484 ("There is ... no principled way of distinguishing economic development 
from other public purposes."). 
63. See id. ("Promoting economic development is a traditional and long-accepted function 
of government."). 
64. See id. at 475 ("Ten of the parcels are occupied by the owner or a family member; the 
other five are held as investment properties."). 
65. See Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 957, 962-
67 (2004) (discussing the uncompensated increment). But see Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected 
Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105 MICH. L. REv. 101, 130-36 (2006) (case study 
indicating that above-market compensation for takings occurs more often than is commonly 
thought). 
66. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (The public use clause's purpose is to 
protect "stable property ownership by providing safeguards against . . . unfair use of the 
government's eminent domain power-particularly against those owners who, for whatever reasons, 
may be unable to protect themselves in the political process against the majority's will"). 
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actual physical public use or ownership.67 Roads, hospitals, and military bases 
are of clear, direct public benefit because they are owned by the government. 
Stadiums, railroads, and utilities are open to the public so they too are of clear, 
direct public benefit. 68 The dissents diverged, however, over whether there could 
be any additional "exigency" that would also justify an exercise of eminent 
domain.69 Justice O'Connor's approved exigency was the goal of affirmative 
harm prevention.70 Under this perspective, Berman and Midkiffwere transformed 
from being based on deference to a public purpose into exercises of eminent 
domain for the purpose of harm elimination.71 
Under either of the dissents' categorical formulations, economic 
development takings are constitutionally impermissible.72 This formulation is not 
only impracticable, but also overly restrictive. First, the actual use/direct benefit 
standard simply invites comparisons between the new proposed uses and the 
approved list. In some places, this means that all exercises of eminent domain 
will be approved; in others, it means too many will be restricted. The test is not 
meaningfully more doctrinally beneficial. Second, by offering a finite list of 
approved "public" purposes justifying eminent domain, the dissenting and 
majority opinions all resort to tradition. The majority rests on economic 
development as a traditional local government project.73 The significant 
67. [d. at 497-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (including the following as examples of 
appropriate takings: (1) public ownership; (2) actual use by the public [common carriers, railroad, 
a public utility, or stadium]; (3) and property that serves a public purpose and meets certain 
exigencies [and harm elimination]). 
68. [d. 
69. See infra notes 86-89 and accompanying text (Justice Thomas rejects the harm prevention 
exigency). 
70. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 500. 
71. See id. (citing the harm prevented in Berman as "blight resulting from extreme poverty 
and in Midkiff [as the harm of] ... oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth"); see also Kelo, 545 
U.S. at 486 n.16 ("Nor do our cases support Justice O'Connor's novel theory that the government 
may only take property and transfer it to private parties when the initial taking eliminates some 
'harmful property use.' There was nothing 'harmful' about the nonblighted department store at 
issue in Berman.") (citation omitted). 
72. Most dramatically, in this formulation of clear and rigid lines between valid public and 
invalid private uses, the O'Connor dissent argues for a two-pronged retreat from deference to all 
exercises of the police power arguing that the police power is not coterminous with public use. [d. 
at 501. This "errant language" is now said to derive from mistaken dicta in Berman and Midkiff that 
was not necessary to the actual holdings in those cases. /d. This language is extraordinary since 
the Berman opinion was a direct response to the department store owner's claim that his property 
was not harmful slum housing-it was commercial property in good condition. Berman v. Parker, 
348 U.S. 26, 31 (1954). Thus, in Berman, there needed to be a rationale offered as to why the 
scope of the redevelopment power could expand to include the functioning store when the direct 
problem was dilapidated alley housing in a small section of the quadrant. 
73. See id. at 484 ("[E]conomic development is a traditional and long-accepted function of 
government. "). 
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difference is that the dissent's proposed categorical standard of review is 
troublingly similar to Agins v. City of Tiburon's74 "substantially advances" 
regulatory takings test. The dissent's categories represent judicially approved 
notions of appropriate projects that the Court implicitly approves as substantially 
related to legitimate public purposes. Because the Court repudiated the 
"substantially advances" test in Lingle v. Chevron,15 the dissent would put 
eminent domain doctrine in a dilemma. Under the dissent's fonnulation, an 
uncompensated regulatory taking would be subjected to a more deferential 
standard of review, while a compensated physical taking would be subjected to 
a heightened, standard-less, standard of review. 
On the other hand, the dissent better acknowledges the difficulty of the 
public-private split. Justice O'Connor aptly points out that due to the merger of 
public and private, it is pointless to divine illicit purely private purposes.76 In 
economic development takings, "private benefit and incidental public benefit are, 
by definition, merged and mutually reinforcing.'>77 O'Connor's dissent also 
correctly rejects looking solely at the city's motive to divine the true benefits to 
the city: "How much the government does or does not desire to benefit a favored 
private party has no bearing on whether an economic development taking will or 
will not generate secondary benefit for the public."78 
While Justice O'Connor correctly identifies one type of public/private 
chimera, she misses another. The types of underlying redevelopment supporting 
the exercise of eminent domain that would meet her approval include railroads, 
roads, and stadiums as valid public uses.79 Private companies built those 
railroads for their own profit and wielded great power in the states where the 
railroad tracks were run.80 Justice O'Connor's stadium example illustrates the 
illusory certainty of the public-private distinction, since most stadiums, even 
though publicly financed, are built at the behest of private sports team-owners, 
according to their specifications. Thus, the stadiums usually include expensive 
lUXUry skyboxes, which are inaccessible to the public, to meet team owners' 
private profit goals.81 The counter-intuitive conclusion to be drawn from Justice 
O'Connor's stadium example is that perhaps the public role in building these 
74. 477 U.S. 225, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 
(2005). 
75. 544 U.S. 528, 542 (2005). 
76. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 502-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
77. Id. at 502. 
78. Id. 
79. See id. at 497-98. 
80. See AuJERTAM. SBRAGIA,DEBTWISH: ENTREPRENEURIAL CITIES, U.S. FEDERALISM AND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 48-50 (1996) (during the nineteenth century, cities and states competed 
to attract railroads by issuing bonds, on which they eventually defaulted, because of their desperate 
quest to avoid falling into oblivion by not having a railroad pass through their town). 
81. See Peter Sepulveda, Comment, The Use oj the Eminent Domain Power in the Relocation 
ojSports Stadiums to Urban Areas: Is the Public Purpose Requirement Satisfied?, 11 SETON HALL 
J. SPORTL. 137, 151 (2001) (contesting the publicness of publicly financed stadium development). 
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exclusive stadiums should not be considered public, but rather a further example 
of the impermissibly private. 
Moreover, it is not possible to completely divorce the question of the validity 
of an exercise of eminent domain from the City's motive. Motives for 
redevelopment are particularly relevant since the touted benefits of economic 
development are based on projections that are often indirect, long-term, and 
incremental. Thus, motive is a way to evaluate whether the city's projections 
should be trusted. On the other hand, the reality is that local government often 
intends to benefit a favored private party, and that intention is actually part of the 
projected economic benefit. However, Justice O'Connor's dissent indirectly 
concedes that intention is, in fact, relevant because of the political process 
failures inherent in city redevelopment. 82 
Although mired in the formalism of creating core categorical definitions of 
valid and invalid takings, the most apt observation in Justice O'Connor's dissent 
is that citizens in a redevelopment area are unable to protect their interests in the 
political process and indirectly acknowledge the problem of subordination. "The 
beneficiaries are likely to be those citizens with disproportionate influence and 
power in the political process, including large corporations and development 
firms. As for the victims, the government now has license to transfer property 
from those with fewer resources to those with more."S3 While O'Connor's 
dissent fails to elaborate, it comes within a hair's breadth of acknowledging the 
class subordination inherent in redevelopment. In light of the Court's past 
unwillingness to acknowledge class as a basis for Equal Protection, this 
acknowledgment is actually significant.84 It is the opening for a conversation on 
how the Constitution should respond to systematic local political process failures 
and the resulting wealth-based inability to resort to democratic devices for voice, 
82. Justice O'Connor correctly argues that federalism protects important state functions, but 
federalism seems out of place here since it does not provide protection for citizens. The Tenth 
Amendment is not a Constitutional provision "meant to curtail state action." Kelo, 545 U.S. at 504 
(O'Connor, J. dissenting). While I agree, one cannot avoid the reality that Kelo's federalism 
rationale (i.e., returning the issue to the states) has really galvanized extremely important local 
political activism as well as spurred others to begin questioning the wisdom of economic 
development activities. For an account of the typical local reaction to eminent domain, see Jennifer 
Egan, A Developing Story, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2007, at A15 ("[R]esignation and bitter apathy 
afflicted many residents, who disliked the project but felt that it was unstoppable. What chance do 
we have ... when our mayor, governor and borough president are in lockstep with a private 
developer?"). 
83. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
84. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1973)(rejecting 
"wealth discrimination" in property-tax based school funding as a basis for suspect classification 
and strict scrutiny). According to the Court, it was not feasible to do so without confronting "hard 
threshold questions, including whether it makes a difference for purposes of consideration under 
the Constitution that the class of disadvantaged 'poor' cannot be identified or defined in customary 
equal protection terms, and whether the relative-rather than absolute-nature of the asserted 
deprivation is of significant consequence." [d. at 19. 
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redress, or protection. Unfortunately, the categorical public-use approach as a 
protection for individual property rights provides inadequate conceptual space 
to focus on the problem of local political process defects and does not explore 
possibilities for addressing it. 
Surprisingly,85 Justice Thomas's dissent comes the closest to directly 
engaging issues of subordination present in redevelopment. He declines to 
approve harm elimination or "blight" takings.86 Justice Thomas, like Justice 
O'Connor, applies an actual use standard87 and finds that economic development 
never outweighs residents' property ownership rights.88 However, in areas that 
would be labeled as "blighted," he would only allow eminent domain to be used 
if the supposed harmful land uses failed to meet a common law nuisance 
standard.89 This issue is important since the flurry of post-Kelo, state anti-
eminent domain reform legislation has retained blight as an acceptable 
justification, without regard to the subordination of eminent domain. Instead, 
Justice Thomas's view accounts for both the wealth and race subordination 
inherent in redevelopment.9o He notes the systematic likelihood that "poor 
communities" will bear the brunt of economic development takings91 beyond any 
financially compensable leve1.92 He argues for heightened judicial review based 
on footnote four of Carolene ProductS.93 
The deferential standard this Court has adopted for the Public Use 
Clause is therefore deeply perverse. It encourages "those citizens with 
disproportionate influence and power in the political process, including 
85. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Just Another Brother on the Set?: What Justice Clarence 
Thomas Teaches Us About the Influence of Racial Identity, 90 IOWA L. REv. 931 (2005) (arguing 
that Justice Thomas's jurisprudence falls within a tradition of Black conservative thought, which 
condemns Black criminal defendants rights in favor of Black victims' rights and seeks to protect 
Black people from the stigma of affirmative action). 
86. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 519-20 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that slums can be handled 
under state nuisance law). 
87. Id. at 512 (referring to "quintessentially public goods"). 
88. See id. at 512-14. 
89. Id. at 520. 
90. Id. at 521. 
91. Id. ("Allowing the government to take property solely for public purposes is bad enough, 
but extending the concept of public purpose to encompass any economically beneficial goal 
guarantees that these losses will fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities 
are not only systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but are 
also the least politically powerful."). 
92. Id. ("[N]o compensation is possible for the subjective value of these lands to the 
individuals displaced and the indignity inflicted by uprooting them from their homes."). 
93. Id. at 521-22 ("If ever there were justification for intrusive judicial review of 
constitutional provisions that protect 'discrete and insular minorities,' surely that principle would 
apply with great force to the powerless groups and individuals the Public Use Clause protects." 
(quoting United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938))). 
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large corporations and development firms" to victimize the weak.94 
Influenced by the inherent class discrimination in redevelopment, Justice 
Thomas's dissent argues that the power of government should be restricted to 
prevent its powers from being used by the rich to the disadvantage of the poor. 
Thus, Thomas's dissenting opinion, while advancing an impracticable test, 
correctly formulates the challenges oflocal economic development. As currently 
practiced, local economic development raises fundamental questions about the 
discretion of states and cities to use land to effectuate policy choices at the 
expense of the poor. 
C. Stepping Back to Survey the Glittering Landscape of Redevelopment 
The type of contemplated development in Kelo is not simply limited to New 
London. Similar projects, both large and small, are occurring in cities and 
suburbs around the world. Development of upscale tourist, residential, and 
commercial amenities and twenty-first century core growth industries, such as 
high-tech service industries, health care, and institutions of higher education are 
part of a prevailing approach to seeking economic vitality-the "attraction of the 
affluent." While these projects can be found in residential districts with serious 
abandonment problems that are still owner and tenant occupied,95 much 
redevelopment does not necessarily involve occupied property; it can also be 
vacant brown or grayfield redevelopment.96 Dilapidated downtown districts in 
94. [d. at 522 (citation omitted). 
95. The Biotech Approach. For example, on the east side of Baltimore, a thirty-acre 
residential neighborhood is being transformed with the help of the city's eminent domain powers 
into a biotechnology park in a depressed section of the city, adjacent to Johns Hopkins. See Brief 
for Mayor & City Council of Baltimore as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at *25, Kelo v. 
City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-IOS), 2005 WL 166940. The plan is for the two 
million square-foot center to be used for research and business activities that will complement 
existing work at Johns Hopkins. [d. Estimates are that the development will create 6000 new jobs. 
"Of the approximately 1,700 total properties that the City expects to acquire in East Baltimore, 
approximately 1,150, or about two-thirds, are abandoned, while approximately 550 are 
currently--or recently-occupied private homes or businesses." [d. 
96. The New Private City Approach. In Atlanta, Atlantic Station, for example, consists of 
offices, condominiums, loft-style apartments, town homes, single-family residences, a variety of 
shopping ranging from lKEA to an upscale Dillards Department Store, multiplex cinema, cafes, 
restaurants, and bars. 
The ... development will ultimately include 6 million square feet of ultramodern Class 
A office space; 5000 residential units (from lUXUry condo lofts to more affordable 
townhouses and apartments); 2 million square feet of retail and entertainment space, 
including restaurants and movie theaters; 1000 hotel rooms, and 11 acres of public 
parks. 
Lisa Chamberlain, Square Feet: Building a City Within the City of Atlanta, N.Y. TiMEs, May 24, 
2006, at CS. Its size encouraged the Postal Service to award the neighborhood its own ZIP code: 
30363. See Jamie Gumbrecht, Cracking the Zip Code of Atlanta Cool, ATLANTAJ. CONST., Apr. 
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need of rehab can be involved,97 as well as districts suffering from vacancy but 
serving as a vital source of livelihood for small entrepreneurs.98 Most of the 
redevelopments are mixed use.99 It is nearly impossible across the broad array 
25, 200S, available at www.ajc.comlliving/ contentlliving/storiesl200S/04/25/zipcodes_0427 .html. 
One 242-unit, four-story apartment building, Icon Apartments, will have a 20 percent affordable 
living component. Debra Wood, Momentum Builds at Atlantic Station, SOUTHEAST CONSTR. 
(2005), available at http://www.southeast.construction.comlfeatureslarchive!0506_Feature3.asp. 
97. The New Private Downtown Approach. Attempting large-scale redevelopment on 
property privately owned by multiple parties is fraught with difficulty. For example, the city of 
Baltimore has been trying to get an ambitious redevelopment of its core downtown commercial 
district which has been in decline and long-abandoned by major retailers. The project seeks to 
acquire and transfer to private developers 100 properties owned by a variety of entities. See West 
Side Story: What's at Stake in the Rush to Redevelop Baltimore's Original Downtown, BALT. CITY 
PAPER, June 7, 2002, available at http://www.citypaper.comlnews/story.asp?id=3592. The plan 
has unfolded slowly. Some early projects like the renovation of the Hippodrome Theater and the 
Center Point apartment and office complex are completed. Lorraine Mirabella, West-Side Project 
Meets Resistance; City Preservationists Say Old Retail District Should Be Saved, BALT. SUN, Dec. 
12, 200S, at 16A. For the most part, however, the project has stalled for a number of reasons. 
There was initial opposition for failing to include historic preservation in the redevelopment plan. 
Charles Belfoure, In Baltimore's West Side, Preservation Story Unfolds, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. IS, 
2001, at All; Tom Chalkey, West Side Glory, BALT. CITY PAPER, Feb. 2,2000, available at 
http://www.citypaper.comlnews/story.asp?id=249S. There has been opposition from property 
owners and small business owners who claim they were not included in any part of the planning. 
The project has been the subject of three lawsuits over failure to make information available to 
bidders to be the developer, minority contractors alleging failure to comply with public contracting 
requirements, and a dispute by another failed bidder alleging mistaken inclusion of a key property 
in the redevelopment plan. See Eric Siegel & Jill Rosen, Lawsuit Targets West-side Projects; 
Angelos, Developer Want City to Scrap Superblock Deal, BALT. SUN, Feb. 27,2007, at IA. 
9S. According to one account, ''The unlovely storefronts of the old west side are crammed 
with thriving businesses, most of them owned by Asian immigrants and African-American 
entrepreneurs who are, to paraphrase Bill Clinton's line, working hard and playing by the rules." 
Chalkey, supra note 97. 
99. Examples include the Atlantic Station project in Atlanta, Georgia, the 13S-acre mixed-use 
brownfield redevelopment on the site of Atlantic Steel, a former metals-recycling business. See, 
e.g., James Murdock, Next Stop: Atlantic Station, COMMERCIAL PROPERTY NEWS, Aug. I, 2003, 
available at http://www.allbusiness.comloperationslfacilities-commercial-real-estate!4422322-
l.htrnl. Waterfront redevelopment is extremely popular as well. In the Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area, not one but two redevelopments are currently underway, unrelated but relatively 
close to each other. For example, the traditionally Black section of Southeast is slated to be 
transformed along its waterfront, along the Anacostia River in Washington, D.C., as part of the 
Anacostia Waterfront Initiative. See Anacostia Waterfront Initiative, http://www.planning.dc.gov/ 
planning/cup/view,a. 12S5,q,571105,planningNav _GID, 170S,planningNav ,13234 I I.asp (last visited 
Mar. 12, 2009). This project consists of a 2S00-acre development along the Potomac River 
comprised of ten different sub-projects, including a new baseball stadium for the Washington 
Nationals, a 20-mile Riverwalk Trail System, KeniIworthlParkside (described as "a Mixed-Income, 
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of settings to characterize these developments as good or bad, positive or 
negative. Instead, they simply are. The significance is that regardless of whether 
or not direct displacement occurs, exclusion is inherent in these projects. 
Large redevelopment projects will likely involve the exercise of eminent 
domain, but they also may not. If eminent domain is not exercised, this 
development would be characterized as seemingly purely private in terms of site 
acquisition and construction-financing, yet the City always plays a role in 
facilitating or making that redevelopment possible. loo As argued elsewhere,101 
eminent domain is only a subset of the governmental powers that are used to 
further development. The government's role in facilitating private development 
is ubiquitous and multiple. What is noteworthy is that when the government uses 
the eminent domain power, the government's motive is often to intervene and 
further land exchange value, rather than the use value placed on land by existing 
property owners and other residents. 102 This further begs an alternate explanation 
of the rights and interests at stake beyond property rights conceptualizations. 
Mixed Use Gateway to the Ward 7 Waterfront"), with 2000 residential units and 500,000 square 
feet of commercial and retail space. Office of the Deputy Mayor for Planning and Economic 
Development, Anacostia Waterfront, http://dcbiz.dc.gov/dmpedlcwp/view,a,1365,q,605699, 
dmpedNav,33026.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2009). The issue is not necessarily displacement, but 
who will get to partake in the new residential and commercial amenities. If the redevelopment is 
successful, it will make this area desirable and likely to gentrify. A few miles to the south, in Oxon 
Hill, Maryland, a massive waterfront development, National Harbor, is nearing completion. 
National Harbor, http://www.nationalharbor.comlconsumer/consumer.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 
2009). Loosely reminiscent of Baltimore's Inner Harbor, National Harbor is a 3OO-acre planned 
upscale tourist, entertainment destination centering around a colossal convention center with an 
eighteen-story glass atrium featuring a dramatic view of the Potomac River. Id. The Center is 
surrounded by upscale hotels, condominiums, shopping and restaurant venues along with ample 
parking. See id. 
Redevelopment is also part of stadium development. For example, eminent domain was used 
to condemn both vacant and occupied property for a new stadium for Washington, D.C.'s, new 
baseball team, the Washington Nationals. Dana Hedgpeth, Contesting a Stadium's Power, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 20, 2006, at D03 (detailing the $600 million in city financing for the new baseball 
stadium and land speculation in anticipation of the exercise eminent domain). 
100. See, e.g., Lynne B. Sagalyn, PubliC/Private Development: Lessons from History, 
Research, and Practice, 73 J. AM. PLAN. AsSN. 7, 10 (2007) (discussing the public-private nature 
of redevelopment); Marc B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme 
Court: Kelo v. City of New London, VT. J. ENVTL. L. 41 (2005). 
101. See Audrey G. McFarlane, The New Inner City: Class Transformation, Concentrated 
Affluence and the Obligations of the Police Power, 8 U. PA. 1. CaNST. L. 1 (2006) [hereinafter 
McFarlane, The New Inner City]. 
102. Rachel Weber, Extracting Value from the City: Neoliberalism and Urban 
Redevelopment, in SPACES OF NEOLIBERAUSM: URBAN REsTRUCTURING IN NORTH AMERICA AND 
WESTERN EUROPE 172, 174, 182 (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002) (describing how 
developers, assisted by the State, pursue creative destruction in order to extract the economic value 
from fixed assets like real estate). 
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One of the most controversial large redevelopment projects currently 
underway is the Atlantic Yards Arena and Redevelopment Project in the Prospect 
Heights neighborhood of Brooklyn, New York. 103 This is a twenty-two-acre 
redevelopment of underutilized and underdeveloped rail yards and other 
properties in the midst of a thriving Brooklyn neighborhood. I04 The planned 
mixed-use development will include sixteen towers with more than 6000 units 
of rental housing, with fifty percent set aside for low and middle income 
renters,105 four office buildings, a glass-walled sports arena (for the New Jersey 
Nets) to be designed by renowned architect Frank Gehry, a hotel, and six to 
seven acres of open space. 106 The City will use eminent domain to clear parts of 
the neighborhood. 107 
One view of redevelopment is that both privately and publicly sponsored 
redevelopment is crucial to allow cities to adapt to changing economic and 
demographic conditions and to revamp and update outdated land uses and 
buildings to meet a changing society's needs. 108 The other view-more difficult 
to articulate because the new developments are often dramatically beautiful-is 
103. Charles V. Bagli, City Planners Recommend 8% Reduction in Atlantic Yards, N.Y. 
TIMEs, Sept. 26, 2006, at B3. 
104. See Nicholas Confessore, Another Step for Downtown Brooklyn Project, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 16,2005, at BlO (describing some of the properties such as repair shops, a food supply store, 
and abandoned residential apartment buildings as dilapidated); Nicholas Confessore, Cities Grow 
up, and Some See Sprawl, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2006, at 43 (the site is located "where a mix of 
vacant lots, low-rise apartments, abandoned buildings, and condominiums now sit"); Peter Slatin, 
Yard Fight, SLATIN REPORT, July 8, 2005, available at hnp:/Iwww.nolandgrab.orglarchives/ 
2oo5/07/yard_fight.html (discussing a rival proposal by the Extell Group for a more modest purely 
residential development that would have built on existing yards footprint and avoided use of 
eminent domain); see also Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 52 (2d Cir. 2008) ("[R]edevelopment 
of an area in downtown Brooklyn affected with substantial blight."). 
1 05. This arrangement is pursuant to a "community benefits agreement" between the developer 
and a variety of community organizations. See Nicholas Confessore, Perspectives on the Atlantic 
Yards Development through the Prism of Race, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 12,2006, at 35. 
106. See Jennifer Egan, A Developing Story, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 24, 2007, at A15 (lamenting: 
"What was mostly lost in this caustic debate was the biggest question of all: what do we 
Brooklynites-a diverse and even divided collective-want our borough to be? Do we want it 
transformed from a sunny, low-lying place into knots of vertical superblocks? Are we content to 
let our borough's future be imposed on us by developers and politicians?"). 
107. A recent challenge to the exercise of eminent domain was rejected at the trial court level. 
Goldstein v. Pataki, 488 F. Supp. 2d 254, 278 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) ("Plaintiffs have not sufficiently 
alleged that the takings at issue violate the public use requirement."), affd, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir.), 
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 2964 (2008); lotham Sederstrom, Yards Sued on Plan to Grab Land, N.Y. 
DAILY NEWS, Feb. 8, 2007, at 1 ("While opponents fear the project will create a traffic nightmare 
and ruin the neighborhood's character, supporters say it will create jobs and affordable housing. "). 
108. According to Rachel Weber, this redevelopment is about prioritizing the exchange value 
placed on inner-city communities rationalized by neo-liberal ideology. Weber, supra note 102, at 
175-76. 
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that not enough attention is paid to how these changes impact the urban social 
fabric by creating consistent winners and losers. The consumption needs and 
tastes of the affluent are prioritized in this form of development. The rejection 
of older, less-upscale, land uses becomes personal, class-based, and seemingly 
subjective. 109 
This unfairness is starkly apparent, purposefully fostered by the market, and 
insufficiently addressed by the cities. Local economic development, as currently 
practiced, raises fundamental questions about the discretion of States and Cities 
to use land to effectuate social and economic policy choices. The history of 
redevelopment is notorious because society's needs are contested and subjective, 
often colored by narrow perspectives, racism 110 and classism. III These questions 
cannot be separated from the eminent domain equation. While the majority 
opinion is persuasive in stating that "bright line" limits cannot, and should not, 
be read into the public use clause to limit government overreaching in the name 
of economic development, does that mean there can be no limits? While the 
public good is the stated goal, the broad range of choices for defining the public 
good and meeting that goal means that much can happen that can have negative 
consequences for ordinary city residents. 
Eminent domain doctrine can grapple more meaningfully with the underlying 
issues presented through some exercises of eminent domain by assessing the 
subordination inherent in redevelopment. The public or private label assigned 
to the eminent domain decisionmaker or ultimate owner does not truly affect or 
change the subordination. Because the current debate on redevelopment is 
109. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,25 (1973) (refusing to apply 
strict scrutiny to economic or wealth discrimination challenge to property-tax based school funding 
disparities). The poor "have none of the traditional indicia of suspectness: the class is not saddled 
with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated 
to such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process." Id. at 28. See James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 140-41 (1971) 
(declining to extend the protection of the Equal Protection Clause against a referendum requirement 
for "low rent" housing developments.); Carl Bialik, The Numbers Guy: Flaws in Measuring the 
World's Poor May Hinder Solutions, WAlLST.J., June 1,2007, at Bl (noting criticism of World 
Bank global poverty numbers being compiled by cumulating national poverty statistics-"[s]ome 
economists argue that poverty should be defined as the inability to live at a level each person's 
society deems normal. Lacking a phone in Burundi might not be associated with poverty, but it is 
in the [United States],,). 
110. David Crump, Evidence, Race, Intent and Evil: The Paradox of Purposelessness in the 
Constitutional Racial Discrimination Cases, 27 HOFSTRA L. REv. 285, 315 (1998) ("[In polls] 
whites tend to use the word 'racism' to refer to explicit and conscious belief in racial superiority. 
African-Americans mean something different by racism: a set of practices and institutions that 
result in the oppression of black people."). 
111. See Bradley R. Schiller, Class Discrimination vs. Racial Discrimination, 53 REv. OF 
ECON. & STAT. 263,268 (1971) (suggesting that class discrimination is as harmful and invidious 
as racial discrimination and concluding that poverty harmed Black AFDC recipients more than 
race). 
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conducted only through the jurisprudence of eminent domain, that discussion is 
too narrow. It only recognizes the individual property holder and is confined to 
the public-private distinction, thereby missing the heart of the issues presented 
by redevelopment. Crucial to a broadened, more realistic consideration of 
redevelopment is to account for the subordination inherent in this practice. 
D. The Three Faces of Subordination in Redevelopment 
1. What Is Anti-Subordination?1I2-Anti-subordination originates from the 
Fourteenth Amendment) \3 Equal Protection guarantee. While Equal Protection 
112. Research reveals anti-subordination arguments advanced in hate speech (First 
Amendment), employment law (statutory), and educationJdesegregationJaffmnative action law 
(Fourteenth Amendment). See CATHARINE A. MACKlNNON, FEMINISMUNMOOIFIEO: DISCOURSES 
ON LIfE AND LAW 174 (1987); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1004 (1986) (arguing that anti-subordination should inform 
courts' analysis of equal protection doctrine.); Katherine M. Franke, What's Wrong with Sexual 
Harassment?, 49 STAN. L. REv. 691, 705 n.53 (1997) (noting Catharine MacKinnon's evolution 
from the term, "inequality approach" to "antisubordination"); see also Laurence H. Tribe, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-21, at 1514, § 16-22, at 1521 (2d ed. 1988)(stating that the 
antidiscrimination principle focuses on acts of prejudice, whereas antisubjugation focuses on legally 
reinforced systems that treat some people as second-class citizens); Paul Brest, Forward: In 
Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 6 (1976) (defining the 
antidiscrimination principle as one disfavoring classifications, decisions, and policies based on race 
and noting that other principles may be needed to address questions of economic justice); Kimberle 
Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in 
Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1341 (1988) (arguing that society refuses to 
recognize the role of racial subordination) [hereinafter Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and 
Retrenchment]; Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse 
and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 79-80 (1994); Dorothy E. Roberts, 
Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of Privacy, 
104 HARv. L. REv. 1419, 1450-56 (1991) (applying anti subordination principles to the actions of 
some state governments in criminally prosecuting pregnant drug addicts); accord Karen B. Brown 
& Mary Louise Fellows, Introduction, in TAXING AMERICA 1, 2 (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise 
Fellows eds., 1996) ("What is missing from both the political and the academic debate about taxes 
is a serious consideration of how the tax system exacerbates marketplace discrimination against 
traditionally subordinated groups."); Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows, Preface, in TAXING 
AMERICA, at vii, vii (Karen B. Brown & Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996) (and advocating the 
development of "an analytical framework [that] would both uncover biases in the tax law and reveal 
anti-subordination strategies to keep the tax law from maintaining and perpetuating marketplace 
discrimination."); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disability," 86 VA. L. REv. 
397,452 (2000) ("By reading the ADA as extending its protections only to members of a particular 
socially subordinated group, I draw on the work of scholars who have articulated an 
anti subordination theory as both a description and defense of civil rights law."). 
113. U[N]or shall any State deprive any person oflife, liberty, or property, without due process 
oflaw; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. 
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is typically thought of as being purely about equal treatment between properly 
defined, similarly situated categories of people, a rich literature argues 
convincingly that anti-subordination is the true substantive1l4 protection of the 
Equal Protection Clause. The normative goal is neither mechanically equal 
treatment nor merely avoidance of explicit racial classifications, but rather a 
guarantee that no citizens will be relegated to second-class stanis by virtue of 
societal structures, disadvantage, and oppressive treatment over time. I 15 At the 
core of anti-subordination logic is the recognition that numerical minorities are 
often literally incapable of protecting their interests in a majoritarian political 
process. I 16 However, the goal of anti-subordination is to recognize that 
subordination can be present, even in the absence of explicit racial 
classifications. An accumulation of social practices can act to create a caste-like, 
second-class-citizen status which then reinforces disadvantage. 117 This was at the 
amend. XIV, § 1. 
114. See, e.g., John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: 
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2189 
(1992) (''The point is that almost all the critical race theory literature seems to embrace the ideology 
of anti-subordination in some form." (citing Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment, supra 
note 112, at 1341; Mari J. Matsuda, Voices of America: Accent, Antidiscrimination Law, and a 
Jurisprudence for the Last Reconstruction, 100 YAlE L.J. 1329, 1398-99 (1991»; Charles R. 
Lawrence ill, ForwardAce, Multiculturalism, and the Jurisprudence of Transformation, 47 STAN. 
L. REv. 819, 822-28 (1995) (arguing that liberal individualist theory fails the cause of anti-racism 
and transformative humanization because it offers a nonsubstantive approach to racism that focuses 
exclusively on individual harms and procedural fairness rather than the disestablishment of 
ideologies, systems, and conditions of racial subordination); Charles R. Lawrence ill, Two Views 
of the River: A Critique of the Liberal Defense of Affirmative Action, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 928, 942 
n.51 (2001) [hereinafter Lawrence, Two Views]. 
115. Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in 
Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 HARv. L. REv. 1470, 1477 (2004) ("Anti subordination 
values are not foreign to the modem equal protection tradition, but a founding part of it, deeply 
tempered by other values, including the need to have a Constitution that speaks to all."); see Ian F. 
Haney L6pez, "A Nation of Minorities": Race, Ethnicity, and Reactionary Colorblindness, 59 
STAN. L. REv. 985, 987 n.2 (2007) ("Many critics of the anticlassification approach argue instead 
that, properly understood, the Equal Protection Clause targets only those racial practices that 
contribute to racial hierarchy. The proponents of this antisubordination approach prominently 
include the following: J.M. Balkin ... Owen M. Fiss ... William E. Forbath ... Reva Siegel .. 
. . ") (citations omitted). 
116. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The 
infamous footnote serves as the basis of heightened judicial scrutiny of racial classifications. I have 
always thought it jurisprudentially odd that the source of protection for a subset of American 
citizens is in a footnote. 
117. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Democracy and Inclusion: Reconceptualizing the Role of the 
Judge in a Pluralist Polity, 58 MD. L. REv. 150, 162 (1999) (noting that separate but equal laws 
lead to "'antisubordination,' 'antisubjugation,' 'anti-caste' or 'substantive equality. "'). 
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heart of the desegregation mandate of Brown v. Board of Education,118 for 
example. Segregation involved separate but equal treatment. I 19 By invalidating 
separate but equal, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized that equal treatment 
had a disparate negative effect on Blacks.120 The concept of anti-subordination 
was that separate but equal created a disadvantaged, stigmatized status for 
members of particular racial groups and the Fourteenth Amendment needed to 
be interpreted in a way that addressed these forms of discrimination. 121 Critical 
race theory was built on these insights into the limits of the anti-discrimination 
principle to consistently call for addressing elements of structural 
disadvantage-namely, subordination. These elements stem not from individual 
acts of discrimination, but rather from a series of seemingly non-discriminatory 
acts that keep particular groups of people disadvantaged. 122 
Critical race theory teaches that subordination must be addressed when any 
of the following are present: 1) politically disabling power disparities; 123 2) 
caste-like status; 3) failure to reflect the perspective of the subordinated; 124 or 4) 
118. Siegel, supra note 115, at 1547 ("[I]t is a history of debates over Brown that shows how 
racial conflict haunts the silences, ambiguities, and conflicts of modern equal protection doctrine."). 
119. See Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at Dred Scott, 82 
CIll.-KENT L. REv. 49, 84 (2007) ("The Missouri Compromise barred slaveowners from bringing 
their slaves with them north of 36°30' latitude, imposing what we today would call a 'disparate 
impact' on Southerners. Thus, Dred Scott not only makes an egalitarian argument for slaveholders 
rights, it also makes what we would today call an 'antisubordination' argument."); Perry, supra note 
112, at 79-80 (arguing that the discourse or manner of speaking about transracial adoption is 
subordinating). The goal of anti-subordination is not simply a society in which everyone is treated 
"equally" but rather a society in which each member is guaranteed equal respect as a human being. 
120. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown l), 347 U.S. 483, 495 n. 11 (1954). 
121. See Kathryn Abrams, "Groups" and the Advent of Critical Race Scholarship, at 10, 
available at http://www.bepress.comlilsliss2lartlO (last visited Feb. 21, 2009) (arguing that 
"Groups and the Equal Protection Clause" partially contributed to the emergence of critical race 
theory). But see David A. Strauss, "Group Rights" and the Problem of Statistical Discrimination, 
at 6, available at http://www.bepress.comlilsliss2lartI7 (last visited Jan. 2, 2009) (arguing that the 
anti-subordination principle is not really something new or exotic). 
122. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHILOSOPHY & PUB. AFFAIRS 
107,108 (1976) (proposing to shift Equal Protection doctrine's emphasis on racial classifications 
towards the actual social practices that disadvantage racial groups); see also Owen Fiss, Abstract, 
Another Equality, available at http://www.bepress.comlils/iss2lart.201 (last visited Jan. 2, 2009). 
123. See Richard Thompson Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and 
Racial Segregation, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1365, 1367 (1997) (arguing that "[r]ecent Court decisions 
involving electoral district apportionment and a long-running, if disconnected, set of deliberations 
regarding local government directly implicate issues of group pluralism and subordination as they 
affect democratic institutions"); Perry, supra note 112, at 79 n.204 (citing and characterizing the 
arguments in Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1003, 1005-14 (1986)). 
124. Lawrence, Two Views, supra note 114, at 950-51 ("Critics of liberal theory, including 
critical race theorists, have offered another way to think about promoting equality and human 
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systemic, reinforcing disadvantage. Additionally, anti-subordination is 
unapologetically and openly political. It does not pretend that politics and 
constitutional interpretation do not intermix. 125 However, anti-subordination 
theory has yet to meaningfully confront the real questions of social conflict that 
underlie its goal of social re-ordering,126 and the constraints on courts and 
legislatures to detach themselves from the influence or control of that social 
conflict. 127 Reva Siegel has insightfully observed, 
[I]t is evident why the Court and many of those defending its work began 
to shy from openly justifying equal protection decisions in language 
concerned with group inequality or associated concepts of subordination 
and status. Reasoning about practices that unjustly disadvantage groups, 
or enforce their inferior or second-class status, involves positive and 
normative claims of a politically provocative sort. As a descriptive 
matter, concepts of subordination focus attention on agonistic group 
relations that structure the polity. As a normative matter, concepts of 
subordination draw into question the legitimacy of customary practices 
and understandings that regulate, and rationalize, the social position of 
groups. 128 
Siegel's critique is not made purely from the perspective that one person's gain 
is another's loss. Instead, it arises from the recognition that material resources 
are at stake and recognizing harm in a society has profound implications. 129 
dignity, one that reflects the perspective of the subordinated."). 
125. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Tum and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 
94 CAL. L. REv. 1,4 (2006) ("[S]ocial and not legal change is what will be necessary to eliminate 
structural workplace inequalities."); Calmore, supra note 114, at 2137-38 (arguing that critical race 
theory and jazz have similar origins in that both involve notions of oppositional cultural and 
political practices and potentially effective use of fundamental criticism of society); Mark Tushnet, 
Popular Constitutionalism as Political Law, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 991, 991 (2006) (defining 
popular constitutionalism as "the deployment of constitutional arguments by the people themse1 ves, 
independent of, and sometimes in acknowledged conflict with, constitutional interpretations offered 
and enforced by the courts"). 
126. But see Rhonda V. Magee Andrews, The Third Reconstruction: An Alternative to Race 
Consciousness and Colorblindness in Post-Slavery America, 54 AlA. L. REv. 483,530 n.199 
(2003) ("[T]he anti subordination jurisprudence has remained associated with a concept of race that 
inevitably would perpetuate the notion in ways that reflect nineteenth century thinking .... Thus, 
the anti subordination principle has not yet led to an adequate critique of the notion of race itself, 
or to a reconsideration of the comparison-based approach implicit in equal protection analysis."). 
127. See Robin West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REv. 641, 
715 (1990); Robin West, Abstract, Groups. Equal Protection and Law, available at 
http://www.bepress.comlils/iss2/art8 (last visited Jan. 5, 2009) (arguing that the Equal Protection 
Clause provides political ideals to guide legislation, rather than legal restraints on legislation). 
128. Siegel. supra note 115. at 1544-45 (emphasis added). 
129. [d. 
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Siegel's theory seeks a re-allocation of rights and privileges. 130 Her critique also 
considers the profound aspects of identity that arise from privilege and a sense 
of vulnerability and threat of danger that accompanies privileged identities.131 
The task, then, is to devise a way to make the process fair. 
Even more complicating are the unresolved tensions between race and class. 
At present, eminent domain doctrine leaves racial minorities and others living in 
redevelopment areas to the urban political process. 132 The reality is that minority 
elected officials are often in charge of carrying out redevelopment. The 
economic forces and logic driving that decisionmaking and its subordinating 
effect are largely unchanged by the decisionmaker's racial identity. A purely 
racial lens is insufficient to understand the nature of the subordination. Instead, 
race, class, and the political process-in particular, the informality of the 
political process in redevelopment-must be used to flesh out an understanding 
of the subordination. Anti-subordination theory is complex, multi-dimensional, 
and capable of adapting,133 and when applied to eminent domain, provides an 
opportunity to consider what redevelopment is and should be about. 
2. Subordination in the Types of Redevelopment Projects.-Redevelopment 
seems like a straightforward process of acquiring and clearing a site and 
130. Id. 
131. For example, Reva Siegel makes a helpfully inductive observation about the impact of 
social conflict on the retreat of the Supreme Court from the anti-subordination principle. She 
argues that "[i]n deciding Brown, the Court had adopted an interpretation of the Equal Protection 
Clause that would alienate groups with the social standing and skills to challenge the authority of 
the Court itself." See id. at 1544. She continues, 
Id. 
As the Court read the Constitution to draw into question the position and values of 
whites who sought to maintain segregation, they in tum charged the Court with 
illegitimacy and group partiality. Under assault, the Court needed more than a 
principled justification for its interpretive practice. It needed an account of the 
Constitution that could command the allegiance-if not the assent, then the engaged 
dissent---of those the Court's decisions had estranged. 
132. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, "Unexplainable on Grounds Other than Race": The 
Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U.IIL. L. REv. 
615,682 ("Of the possible equal protection theories, the anti subordination or anticaste theories do 
more to dismantle the historical legacy of racial and other forms of domination. Many scholars 
have advocated anti subordination theories. A concern that the law promote substantive equality 
by considering 'the concrete effects of government policy on the substantive condition of the 
disadvantaged' unifies their analyses." (quoting Roberts, supra note 112, at 1454)). Hutchinson 
also argues that the approach leaves minorities to the political process. Id. 
133. Darren Lenard Hutchinson,ldentity Crisis: "Intersectionality, " "Multidimensionality, " 
and the Development of an Adequate Theory of Subordination, 6 MICH. J. RACE & L. 285, 288 
(2001) (drawing from race-sexuality theory and calling for a multi-dimensional antisubordination 
theory noting "structural problems in anti subordination theory ... [that positions] progressive 
movements as oppositional and conflicting forces, rather than as potential alliances and coalitions, 
and the failure to recognize the multidimensional and complex nature of subordination"). 
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constructing a set of buildings to create a new use for the property. Nevertheless, 
this process also involves practices related to group formation and social 
exclusion, as well as oppression and domination. Redevelopment involves social 
decisions about land use that significantly alter property ownership patterns, 
neighborhoods, and community networks. 134 Because redevelopment occurs in 
furtherance of an upper-middle-class attraction strategy, the policy, in effect, 
prioritizes the land use needs of one social class over the other. 135 
The similarity of these glittering new projects to each other is striking.136 Not 
only is mixed-use (commercial and residential) development the wave of the 
present, but upscale residential and commercial developments are the standard 
of the day. One advantage of mixed-use development is it provides nearly all that 
young urban dwellers want-proximity to services and entertainment, 
excitement, walkability, upscale convenience, and controlled environment. The 
main disadvantage of mixed-use development is that it is usually market-driven. 
The residential tenant mix is expected to predict, match, and enable the 
commercial tenant mix. Although non-upscale development can be profitable, 
it is omitted from most redevelopment schema because it does not "fit the 
profile." 137 
There are underlying structural reasons for the similarities of these 
developments. Developers replicate the same schemas because they are forced 
to tell a cognizable story that financial markets easily understand.138 Prevailing 
financing mechanisms require this exclusion to replicate the limited recognized 
types of real estate investment products. Failure to replicate makes financing 
more expensive or even unavailable. 139 Financing demands predictable, 
standardized forms of development. According to Christopher Leinberger, 
nineteen standard real estate products are used by real estate developers to 
produce developments that banks and other investors can readily recognize and 
134. See Mihaly, supra note 5, at 4 (stating that "redevelopment [is] one of the most powerful 
roles assigned to government"). 
135. For a more complete discussion of this point, see McFarlane, The New Inner City, supra 
note 101, at 3; see also Herman L. Boschken, Global Cities, Systemic Power, and Upper-Middle-
Class Influence, 38 URB. AlT. REv. 808, 808 (2003) (an "important consideration in urban 
globalization is the disproportionately high presence of UMC whose membership includes 
institutional professionals at the forefront of postmodern awareness and international experience. 
Symbolized by a lifestyle genre, the upper middle class is more than a marker of the global city. It 
exerts a subliminal influence that prescribes the cityscape policy that outcomes planners emphasize 
to ensure principal membership for the city in global exchange"). 
136. See supra Part I.C. 
137. See MARy PATII1..O McCoY, BlACK PICKET FENCES 190 (1999). 
138. MICHAEL SUK-YOUNG CHWE, RATIONAL RITuAL: CULTURE, COORDINATION, AND 
COMMON KNOWlEDGE 25-49 (2001) (discussing ritual, common knowledge and the need to 
stigmatize). 
139. See Christopher B. Leinberger, Back to the Future: The Need/or Patient Equity in Real 
Estate Development Finance, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION REs. BRIEF, Jan. 2007, at 1,7. 
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use to calculate the risk of financing or investment. l40 Building projects must 
conform to one of these standard real estate product types or financing becomes 
significantly more expensive. The problem is further exacerbated because real 
estate financing is globalized, and distant investors in real estate investment 
trusts (REITs) demand certain types of development (i.e., the product) that 
produce quick returns. Not only does this lead to standardization (typically 
upscale), but this homogenization leads to conservatism in decisionmaking about 
the types of development to pursue.141 
This lack of "non-upscale" development is also partly due to the lack of 
subsidy to provide incentive for affordable, accessible development. 142 The 
historic, judicially ratified opposition to multifamily housing in zoning 
ordinances and land use decisionmaking indicates that the shortage of non-
upscale development is not solely a question of financial cost. 143 Even when 
financial support is available for building accessible development, it will often 
be opposed on race and class grounds. As Sheryll Cashin argues, property 
owners have a financial stake in opposing development that might negatively 
impact their property values. 144 However, this opposition is also likely due to the 
stigmatization of certain social groups. The uniformity of these redevelopment 
schemas contains an ideology of exclusion and inclusion. 145 Therefore, a better 
accounting of the social psychology and political economy of exclusion is 
needed. 146 These often "cookie-cutter" developments practice social 
140. See Christopher B. Leinberger, The Needfor Alternatives to the Nineteen Standard Real 
Estate Product Types, PLACES, July 2005, at 24, 24. 
141. Jeffrey H. Epstein, Advertisers Divide and Conquer, FuTURIST, Mar. 1998, at 2, 16 
(reviewing Joseph Turow and arguing that the prevalence of marketing to segments is splitting the 
social order: "radio, magazines, and cable television ... in particular are more segmented than 
ever. Relatively little content . . . is aimed at a demographically broad audience. People 
increasingly filter their view ofthe world through these defined media experiences. One reason for 
the marketing is that segmentation increases the likelihood that the targeted consumer will 
experience a sense of personal identification with a product's image and therefore feel an interest 
in purchasing and using it"). What concerns Turow most are the secondary impacts on society-the 
invisible walls of isolation created by the comfort zones of similarity. See JOSEPH TuRow, 
BREAKING UP AMERICA: ADVERTISERS AND THE NEW MEDIA WORID, at ix (1997). 
142. See J. Peter Byrne & Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban 
Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 527, 531 (2007) (detailing eight possible and 
potentially conflicting objectives of subsidized housing: "1) decent shelter; 2) wealth creation; 3) 
social integration; 4) urban vitality; 5) civic engagement; 6) training; 7) institution building; and 
8) efficient use of public funds"). 
143. See, e.g., Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-88 (1926). 
144. SHERYIL CASHIN, THE FAILURES OF INTEGRATION: HoW RACE AND ClASS ARE 
UNDERMIN1NG THE AMERICAN DREAM (2004). 
145. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to Exclude, 104 
MICH. L. REv. 1835, 1850-53 (2006) (exploring strategies to exclude indirectly by creating 
exclusionary vibes or constructing developments with exclusionary amenities). 
146. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. 
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differentiation with exclusion as the accepted development model through the use 
of clusters and geo-demograpbic profiling. 147 Target marketing in particular 
locations leads to stigma 148 and disdain. 149 Clusters facilitate exclusion by 
allowing specific targeting of demographic groupS.150 Society has not yet fully 
appreciated how such target marketing divides instead of unites. 151 Class and 
performance are made increasingly more important because of the rise of mass 
affluence. 152 Citizens have been trained to be consumers; to desire, fantasize, and 
"fetishize" market segmentation. Whereas a greater number of people depend on 
open access to public recreational opportunities, the rise of mass affluence 
L. REv. 437, 454-55 (2006) (extending the indirect exclusionary argument to clubs and 
neighborhoods). 
147. See generally IRIs MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POUTICS OF DIFFERENCE (1990); 
IRIs MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY (2002). 
148. See Robert J. Sampson & Stephen W. Raudenbush, Seeing Disorder: Neighborhood 
Stigma and the Social Construction of "Broken Windows," 67 Soc. PSYCH. Q. 319, 319 (2004) 
(Perceptions of disorder increase based on race and class identity. "Seeing disorder appears to be 
imbued with social meaning ... generating self-reinforcing social processes that may help account 
for the perpetuation of urban racial inequality."). 
149. Stigma or stigmatization "refers to an invisible sign of disapproval which permits insiders 
to draw a line around 'outsiders' in order to demarcate the limits of inclusion in any group." 
GERHARD F ALK, STIGMA: How WE TREAT OUTSIDERS 17 (2001). According to Falk, the American 
ideology derived from the Protestant ethic 
includes the belief that individual hard work leads to success and that lack of success 
is caused by moral failings, self-indulgence, and a lack of self-discipline .... Americans 
are likely to take credit for any outcomes in their lives which can be viewed as 
successful and generally approved. Consequently ... those among us who deviate from 
the Protestant work ethic will be stigmatized and ... most Americans, will severely 
reject those who deviate from these norms the most. 
Id. at 334. 
150. This is why Costco in Seattle has a massive coffee machine for fresh ground coffee but 
does not carry jumbo containers of curry as does the Costco in the Washington, D.C., area. See 
MICHAEL J. WEISS, THE CLUSTERED WORID: How WE LIVE, WHAT WE BUY AND WHAT IT Au.. 
MEANS ABOUT WHO WE ARE 9-13 (2000) (using census data, zip codes, and marketing surveys to 
classify people into lifestyle segments based on: (1) where they live-whether in a city, small town, 
or rural area; (2) their lifestage-whether they are young and single, married with children, or a 
retiree; and (3) their marketplace behavior). But see John T. Metzger, Clustered Spaces: Racial 
Profiling in Real Estate Investment, LINCOLN mST. OF LAND POL'y CONF. PAPER 15-16 (2001) 
(arguing that racial segregation is replicated in the use of clusters in real estate investment; 
discussed more extensively in Audrey G. McFarlane, Who Fits the Profile?: Thoughts on Race, 
Class, Clusters, and Redevelopment, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 877 (2006)). 
151. See generally TuRow, supra note 141, at 1-2 (arguing that segmented marketing 
emphasizes divisions rather than overlap). 
152. See generally PAUL NUNES & BRIAN JOHNSON, MASS AFFLUENCE: SEVEN NEW RULES OF 
MARKETING TO TODAY'S CONSUMER 29-58 (2004) (discussing contemporary middle class 
consumer logic and demands for luxury). 
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(financed by credit card debt) means that a huge number of people adopted the 
attitudes and preferences of aristocracy or royalty. In tum, their consumer 
demand for exclusion is built into the consumer market for commodities. The 
home is a cultural commodity, and the ability to stigmatize anyone who 
challenges the fantasy by being too different threatens property values. Since 
types of homes determine types of commercial amenities, types of development 
will likely subordinate certain non-affluent people by developing in ways that 
exclude their needs and interests. 
3. Subordination in the Location ofRedevelopment.-Renowned playwright 
August Wilson wrote ten plays chronicling the Black American experience 
through each decade of the twentieth century. 153 Nearly all of these plays were 
set in the Hill District, a Black neighborhood in Pittsburgh.154 In three ofthese 
plays, set during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s, the characters struggle with the 
universally human quest to cope with and make sense oflife' s challenges. 155 One 
additional ongoing challenge present in two of the plays, Jitney and Two Trains 
Running, is the threat of urban renewal displacing the characters from their 
homes and businesses. 156 In Wilson's final play, Radio Golf, the challenge of 
urban renewal was renamed economic development. The play centers around the 
efforts of one character-a politically well-connected affluent Black developer-
to displace an elderly Black homeowner to make way for a Starbucks and a 
Whole Foods. 157 The threat of redevelopment and displacement featured so 
consistently in plays meant to chronicle Black life illustrates the racialized nature 
of property ownership. The ubiquitous presence of urban renewal-which today 
is termed economic development-means that property ownership in areas with 
race and class transformation potential comes with an inherent limitation-
residency is contingent and subject to revocation. Thus, the second reality of 
subordination in redevelopment is that the places where redevelopment occurs 
are often subordinating. 158 
The measure of state and local government efficacy has long been its ability 
to facilitate economic development. 159 What has changed, however, is that 
globalization is rewriting the face of the city. Because the local economic 
development project currently transpires in cities throughout the United States, 
153. See Jackson R. Bryer & Mary C. Hartig, Introduction to CONVERSATIONS WITH AUGUST 
WILSON, at vii, xiv (Jackson R. Bryer & Mary C. Hartig eds., 2006). 
154. Id. at xi. 
155. /d. at vii-xvi. 
156. See generally Sandra G. Shannon, August Wilson Explains His Dramatic Vision: An 
Interview, in CONVERSATIONS WITH AUGUST WILSON 118, 145-46 (Jackson R. Bryer & Mary C. 
Hartig eds., 2006). 
157. AUGUST WILSON, RADIO GoLF 9,25,48 (2007). 
158. For an excellent, detailed account of how redevelopment affected a Black community in 
Cocoa, Florida, see generally Judith E. Koons, Fair Housing and Community Empowerment: 
Where the Roof Meets Redemption, 4 GEO. J. ON FiGIITING POVERTY 75 (1996). 
159. See Audrey G. McFarlane, Local Economic Development Incentives in an Era of 
Globalization: The Exploitation of Decentralization and Mobility, 35 URB. LAW. 305,309 (2003). 
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local economic development within the context of globalization has become 
increasingly desperate. l60 Local economies are being driven by national and 
global economic imperatives: 
This process of transnational market expansion and integration is 
manifested in a range of phenomena: a new international division of 
labor, the global spread of financial markets, an interpenetration of 
industries across borders, the spatial reorganization of production, a 
temporal acceleration in economic activity, vast movements of 
population, a diffusion of consumer goods, and a welter of transnational 
cultural linkages. Taken together, these serve to significantly alter the 
nature of places, the relations of power, and the lived experiences of 
peoples in most part of the globe. 161 
Though globalization is not a fixed phenomenon and not all agree on its contours, 
causes, benefits, or detriments, it is still much like global warming: people 
generally recognize its presence.162 According to David Harvey, globalization is 
the "freer circulation of money, commodities and people (and hence capital) 
throughout the spaces of the city.,,163 Most significant is the shift in the urban 
economy from production-oriented development to consumption. The chief 
product of local economies shifts from work to leisure, and both local 
government policy and market preference converge in a dramatic urban spatial 
restructuring. The primary mechanism for local economic vitality is "attraction 
of the affluent" through tourism, development of upscale residential and 
commercial amenities, high-tech service industries, and institutions of higher 
education. 
According to Rachel Weber, states make the built environment more flexible 
and responsive to the investment criteria of real estate capital through spatial 
policies such as urban renewal. l64 A broad interpretation of eminent domain 
160. Asmara Tekle Johnson, Correctingfor Kelo: Social Capital Impact Assessments and the 
Re-balancing of Power between "Desperate" Cities, Corporate Interests, and the Average Joe, 16 
CORNELLJ. L. & PUB. POL'y 187,210-29 (2006) (discussing domination of corporations over city 
decisions). 
161. See Sites, supra note 7, at 123. 
162. Saskia Sassen' s work in The Global City posited that certain world cities were centers of 
global finance and production operations such that they were global cities in population, priorities, 
and economic importance. Sassen's insights can be broadened beyond these technopoles of world 
capital to every city in America and across the globe because the global economy has permeated 
localities everywhere. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: NEW YORK, LoNDON, 
TOKYO (2d ed. 2001); e.g., Brian J. Godfrey, Urban Development and Redevelopment in San 
Francisco, 87 GEOGRAPHICAL REv. 309, 322 (1997) (expanding the global city hypothesis to a 
second tier of world cities like San Francisco). 
163. David Harvey, The Political Economy of Public Space, in THE Pouncs OF PuBuc SPACE 
25 (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds., 2006). 
164. Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore, Cities and Geographies of "Actually Existing 
NeoLiberalism," in SPACES OF NEOLIBERAUSM 4 (Neil Brenner & Nik Theodore eds., 2002). 
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doctrine, therefore, accommodates global capital, which seeks flexibility and 
change through creative destruction. Because global capital seeks sites of 
lucrative investment, distant investors in REITs control or influence our local 
spatial conflicts and policies. 165 Urban spatial restructuring and redevelopment 
presents particular issues of land access and land tenure rights for low- and 
moderate-income groups. The site of investment needs to rise in value, and 
property markets with economic value depressed by racialized geography will be 
particularly attractive for investment. 166 Working-class communities will always 
be more subject to redevelopment so property ownership in undervalued or 
centrally located urban areas is a more tenuous form of land tenure. Because 
market forces and government are symbiotically intertwined in the eminent 
domain process, the most compelling property rights and personhood aspect of 
the eminent domain debate is the reality that no justification can erase the impact 
of losing one's home and its deeply associated sense of personal autonomy, 
history, and community. 167 
One reason that discussing eminent domain doctrine remains relevant, 
(arguing that redevelopment is contextual, depending on "the legacies of inherited institutional 
frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices and political struggles"). 
165. Weber, supra note 102, at 186; see generally Jack H. McCall, A Primer on Real Estate 
Trusts: The Legal Basics of REITs, 2 'TRANSACfIONS: TENN. 1. Bus. L. 1 (2001). 
166. I expand on this point in McFarlane, The New Inner City, supra note 101, at 17-21; see 
also Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race Theory 
in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, 45 VILL. 
L. REv. 1037, 1039 (2000) ("[R]acial spaces are visible artifacts of both racial segregation and the 
relations of investment, production and exchange ... within racially subordinated communities. "). 
167. There can be a plus side to the subordination ofthe location of redevelopment because 
one person's subordination is, of course, another person's advantage. In this case, the sweetener 
of the redevelopment's changes are the promise and reality of short-term construction jobs or 
service jobs. That these jobs are often low wage or without benefits is a problem, but many say 
some jobs are better than no jobs. In fact, some argue that one should bow to the inevitability of 
redevelopment and adapt by seeking to benefit from it. For example, the Atlantic Yards Project is 
anticipated to: 
[B]ring an estimated 10,000 permanent and 15,000 construction jobs, contracting 
opportunities for minority- and women-owned business, and billions of dollars in net 
benefits, including $2.8 billion in new net tax revenue to New York City and New York 
State over 30 years. It will make a real difference for a city where 48.3% of African-
American males are unemployed or out of the workforce entirely, more than I in 5 
households pay halftheir income on rent, and fiscal problems continue to force cuts in 
important services. 
Brief for Brooklyn United for Innovate Local Development (BUILD) et aI. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Respondents, Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 
WL 154143, at *3. See Confessore, supra note 105 (demonstrating that color lines have blurred 
in support and opposition of the project with Black working-class people possibly being more in 
support of the project rather than against because of jobs. On the other hand, one black proponent 
concedes the project is "instant gentrification"). 
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despite the recent flurry of state legislation purporting to restrict eminent domain 
for economic development, is that these reform efforts have left the blight 
exception intact. 168 The assumption is eminent domain should not be used for 
economic development, but only for public infrastructure or "blighted" 
properties. Given the difficulty of determining what blight is (one person's 
blight is another person's community), the ease of accepting blight elimination 
as a basis for exercising eminent domain is, in effect, a way of saying "[t]ake 
someone else's property, not mine." Does living in a blighted neighborhood 
mean one's property is any less important to the owners who consider that 
blighted place home?169 What do the 'hood, a highway, and a city park have in 
common? They are the quintessential types of public works projects that satisfy 
the popular conception of the proper exercise of eminent domain. Public 
ownership or public use of a highway or road does not eliminate potential 
subordination if most highways are directed through one's neighborhood. The 
other end of the urban renewal equation for Black communities and the 
devastation they suffered during that era was the federal highway program. 
Funds from that program were used to build highways directly through Black 
neighborhoods, eliminating vibrant and thriving residential neighborhoods and 
commercial districts. While the highways were public, their selected location 
devastated specific people and places.170 
4. Subordination in the Method ofRedevelopment.-The most subordinating 
aspects of redevelopment are probably the methods of development 
decisionmaking. Redevelopment consists of a set of social and decisionmaking 
practices, born both of custom and of economic necessity that favor privatized 
decisionmaking. Redevelopment is a process heavily dominated by national real 
168. See Dana, supra note 15, at 374-78; David A. Dana, Why the Blight Distinction in Post-
Kelo Reform Does Matter, 102 Nw. U. L. REv. COlLOQUY 30, 30-31 (2007) (discussing how few 
states have banned the blight exception). 
169. See Bruce Fein, Eminent Domain, Eminent Nonsense, WASH. TIMEs, Oct. 12,2004, at 
A16 (describing the Fort Trumbull project as a "middle-class re-enactment of Berman" and 
criticizing Petitioners' effort "to make the Constitution pivot on Marxist-like class distinctions" by 
limiting condemnation for redevelopment to blighted land); see also Lynn E. Blais, Urban 
Revitalization in the Post-Kelo Era, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 657, 686 n.178 (2007) ("Indeed, many 
of the cases in which landowners have prevailed in state courts involve urban revitalization projects 
that encompass middle-class landowners."); Dana, supra note 15, at 366 ("Kelo-inspired reform 
movement privileges condemnations for blight removal and ... the stability of middle-class 
households .... "); Amanda W. Goodin, Note, Rejecting the Return to Blight in Post-Kelo State 
Legislation, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 177, 178-79 (2007); see, e.g., City of Norwood v. Homey, 853 
N.E.2d 1115, 1144 (Ohio 2(06); County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Mich. 
2004). 
170. See Tullock v. State Highway Comm'n, 507 F.2d 712, 714 n.l (8th Cir. 1974) (''The 
impact of federally-assisted urban renewal and highway construction projects cannot be 
overestimated. More than two million dwelling units were demolished by such projects in the years 
between 1950-68 according to one study by the National Association of Home Builders, and some 
62,000 families and individuals were displaced by federal highway programs in 1970 alone."). 
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estate investment interests, practices, and conceptions. 171 Although issues arise 
because of genuine conflicts or disagreements over development, for which there 
may be no constitutional prescription (it depends on politics), the main reason 
courts are asked to intervene in eminent domain exercises is a political process 
failure concerning redevelopment. The political process failure occurs because 
the economic development process is highly privatized. Additionally, cities are 
not merely welcoming to business but are using their governmental powers as 
proprietors in what is known as the "public-private" partnership.172 As Marc 
Mihaly argues, public and private roles have been reordered in the public-private 
partnership in order to allocate risk and reward consistent with market conditions 
and requirements. 173 The public-private partnership has become entrenched in 
the way cities think and act. 174 As a consequence, the public role of local 
government in development is now linked with private goals and perspectives. 
Thus, the public's emphases fall necessarily on commercial success. Not only 
does the City establish quasi-private entities to oversee development, but the city 
itself is being carved up into private enclaves, both in terms of property 
ownership as well as financing and governance. Most Cities have authorized 
private business districts to manage these neighborhoods.175 Financing 
techniques such as tax increment financing often leverage future tax revenues 
arising from the new developments. Most, if not all, of the increased taxes are 
paid to repay the district's debt. 176 
Second, opportunities for influencing economic development decisionmaking 
are limited because of the privatized decision-making process and the nature of 
informal communications and relationships between corporations, developers, 
Cities, and quasi-private development agencies. The economic development 
decision-making process is further privatized because it is run by quasi-public 
authorities immune from popular accountability.177 Privatization of public 
171. See supra Part I.D.2-3. 
172. See SUSAN S. F AINSTEIN, THE CITY BUILDERS: PROPERTY DEVEWPMENT IN NEW YORK 
AND LoNDON, 1980-2000, at 136-37 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the lessons learned from publicity-
initiated private redevelopment projects in Kings Cross and Times Square); see also David L.A. 
Gordon, Review of Fainstien, June 2002, http://www.h-net.orglreviews/showrev. php?id=6384. 
173. See Mark B. Mihaly, Public-Private Redevelopment Partnerships and the Supreme 
Court: Kelo v. City of New London, 7 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 41, 41-42 (2005), available at http://www. 
vjel.orgljoumal.php?vol=2005-2006. 
174. For further development of this point, see Audrey McFarlane, Putting the "Public" Back 
into Public-Private Partnerships for Economic Development, 30 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 39, 41 
(2007). 
175. See Audrey G. McFarlane Preserving Community in the City: Special Improvement 
Districts and the Privatization of Urban Racialized Space, 4 STAN. AGORA 5, at *1 (Fall 2003), 
available at http://agora.stanford.edulagoralvolume4/mcfarlane.shtmI. 
176. See George Lefcoe, Finding the Blight that's Rightfor California Redevelopment Law, 
52 HAsTINGS L.J. 991, 995-97 (2001). 
177. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., Privatization and Democratization-Reflections on the Power 
of Eminent Domain, 50 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 751,755 (2006). 
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decisionmaking presents a democratic political process failure. Implicit in this 
argument is the understanding that in the political process of development, the 
lower classes and the politically unconnected lose out in a process that is 
informal, privatized, and shielded in large part from public scrutiny. 
Third, strategic considerations can influence the application and waiver of 
regulatory power through the informal relationship between city administrators, 
developers, and any commercial entity wishing to locate in the city.178 
Regulatory waivers, infrastructure write-downs, and public financing are the 
norm. The public-private distinction continues on its undefined path. Cities act 
like merchants or proprietors when they pursue an explicit affluent class 
attraction policy and use incentives to lure and retain them.179 Charles Tiebout's 
idealized vision of local governments as proprietary entities seeking to attract an 
optimal number of city residents (the "consumer-voters") has come to fruition. 
The problem with Tiebout's "model" is the reality that not everyone fulfills 
Tiebout's idealized assumptions that are fundamental to making his model work. 
Most people do not live on investment income, enjoy perfect employment 
opportunities, or even have the realistic ability of escaping violent impoverished 
neighborhoods. The result of both Tiebout's thesis and the reality of local 
government today is an alarming slant in local government policy towards the 
needs of those with wealth. 
Additionally, the City's proprietor-like acts may relate to the class identity 
of the elite decisionmakers who dominate development decisionmaking. The 
existence of these networks suggests that part of the reason for economic 
development's popularity as a local government project is not only the desire to 
promote the economic growth of the municipality; it may also be attributable to 
the desire to get along with one's elite peers. 180 An alternate explanation is that 
the networks exist because private business has a way of legitimizing public 
government. This is confirmed by the prevalence of informal relationships and 
communications between corporations, developers, Cities, and quasi-private 
development agencies as the operative mode of conducting city life.181 Deal-
making and public subsidy of infrastructure costs and coverage of site acquisition 
expenses are a part of this process. Redevelopment is characterized by formal 
deal-making that is preceded and shaped by informal relationships and behind-
the-scenes communication and agreements. These deals are run through public 
approval processes only when absolutely necessary. By the time the deal reaches 
the public process, the parameters are set and the nature of the development is no 
178. A pro-economic development discourse also makes economic development seem 
inevitable and beneficial. See David Wilson, Metaphors. Growth Coalition Discourses and Black 
Poverty Neighborhoods in a U.S. City, 28 ANTIPoDE 72, 73 (1996) (analyzing the metaphors used 
in "growth" discourse in urban development). 
179. See McFarlane, The New Inner City, supra note 101, at 21-22. 
180. Or, at the very least, one's class position must undeniably influence one's perspective 
about what is desirable development. 
181. See generally BERNARD J. FRIEDEN & LYNNE B. SAGALYN, DOWNTOWN, INc. How 
AMERICA REBUILDS CITIES 17 (1989) (describing these relationships in the mid-twentieth century). 
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longer subject to question or significant modification. 182 Thus, anyone inclined 
to oppose such deals is forced into an all-or-nothing situation: take it or leave 
it. 183 
Fourth, development must happen quickly to be cost-effective. Politics are 
incremental. Thus far, these disagreements over development have been ignored 
in both the blight and the economic development context. Under the current 
regime, the effect of the broad interpretation of public purpose is that city 
property owners are left to the political process. Further indication of political 
process failure is that individual property owners become the inadvertent 
champions for their communities by opposing the taking of their individual 
parcels. But their opposition is almost too little, too late. They should have been 
involved in the formulation of the plan. Opposition to the plan typically proves 
ineffective in the long term and victories usually only slow down the process. 
The individual property owner against the government requires organizing and 
activism to combat governmental decisionmaking. Even if one fights, 
displacement may not be averted and the ability to return is not guaranteed. 
In light of the nearly unlimited discretion afforded to states and local 
governments in the use of eminent domain power, the real controversy is fueled 
by the propriety of the underlying development plan-or to use the Court's 
language, the carefully considered development plan. 184 The institutional norms 
and structures of redevelopment sound very good on paper. The public entity, 
the City, is authorized by the State to control the use of land. The planning 
process seeks public input. The government enters into agreements with 
developers to achieve jointly what either could not achieve on its own because 
it is nearly impossible to cost-effectively assemble parcels for redevelopment 
independently. The government does not bring the organizational structure, 
know-how, or finances to carry out projects alone. Often, the anticipated market 
barriers of assembly problems suggest that a deal will not be touched. The lack 
of public accountability in economic development decisionmaking then raises 
questions about how those plans are put together and whether a plan adequately 
accounts for all relevant dimensions of the public interest. The lack of public 
accountability also raises issues of public resource allocation towards large 
private enterprises.18S Many people have common-sense impressions that Cities 
182. See Patience A. Crowder, "Ain't No Sunshine": Examining Informality and State Open 
Meeting Acts as the Anti-Public Norm in Inner-City Redevelopment Deal Making, 74 TENN. L. REv. 
623, 638 (2007). 
183. See, e.g., David Nakamura, Council Approves Altered Stadium Deal; Requirement for 
50% Private FinanCing Leaves Team's D.C. Future in Question, WASH. POST, Dec. 15,2004, at 
AOl; David Nakamura & Thomas Heath, Baseball Rejects Council's Changes in Financing Plan 
for D.C. Stadium, WASH. POST, Dec. 16,2004, at AOl; see also GREGORY J. CROWlEY, THE 
POLITICS OF PLACE: CONTENTIOUS URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN PITTSBURGH, 145-46 (2005) (case 
studies suggesting that city leaders strategically release information as late as possible to forestall 
opposition). 
184. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005). 
185. See Peter D. Enrich, Saving the StatesJrom Themselves: Commerce Clause Constraints 
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are beholden to big corporations and developers and are engaged in naked land-
grabs to redevelop property to more lucrative tax-receivable, luxury-related land 
uses like condos and upscale retail and entertainment complexes. 
The eminent domain controversy focuses on taking property from private 
parties and transferring it to developers, i.e., other private persons, to put the 
property to another use consistent with the town's revitalization plans. It seems 
a violation of all principles of property ownership to allow government to 
terminate one's property rights for the benefit of another. Yet, would 
government-run reconstruction projects produce a better outcome? The public-
private distinction is not helpful in resolving the eminent domain/redevelopment 
dilemma. From an anti-subordination standpoint, redevelopment is not "okay" 
by virtue of any particular legislative classification. ls6 Instead, subordination 
arises from the systematic impact of executing particular governmental acts. In 
Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, for example, the Supreme Court allowed a 
single homeowner to bring an equal protection claim based on unequal treatment 
in the execution of governmental regulations. ls7 If a single act by government 
can be the basis for an equal protection claim, then the cumulative effects of 
similar redevelopment decisions by different local governments should seem a 
justifiable basis for an inquiry into the use of eminent domain and the nature of 
government support for redevelopment. 
The reliance on a carefully considered plan leaves room for a form of 
municipal corruption which is the giving in to the taste of the affluent and 
reinforcing the disadvantage of not being upscale. If private companies want the 
benefit of public powers for redevelopment, then their developments should 
necessarily reflect the population in terms of residential and commercial 
amenities. The issue is the forces of capital, the intersection of race, class, and 
geography, and the fight for the social status of the city. ISS This aspect of 
on State Tax Incentives for Business, 110 HARV. L. REv. 377,393 (1996) (discussing the pressure 
to engage in economic development through business incentive competition). But see Dairnler-
Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332,343 (2006) (state and city taxpayers Commerce Clause 
challenge to massive business tax incentives rejected for lack of standing under Article ill of U.S. 
Constitution). 
186. Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REv. 
341, 343 (1949) (in most contexts, the basic role of the Equal Protection Clause is to act as a limit 
on government classifications); see, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. I, 10 (1992) (''The Equal 
Protection Clause does not forbid classifications. It simply keeps governmental decisionmakers 
from treating differently persons who are in all relevant respects alike."). 
187. Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (per curiam) (finding no 
cause of action because the practical result will probably be the proliferation in the federal district 
courts of cases where an individual person claims that governmental officials have treated him or 
her unequally). 
188. See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, Global Markets, Racial Spaces and the Role of Critical Race 
Theory in the Struggle for Community Control of Investments: An Institutional Class Analysis, 45 
VIlL. L. REv. 1037, 1048 (2000) ("[T]he struggle against subordination must be understood as a 
struggle for power within the institutional arrangements through which power is legally organized 
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Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has been an explicit project of the study 
of regulatory takings. 189 Regulatory takings is also an anti-subordination 
doctrine, albeit not to avoid stigma, but to preserve the privileges and privileged 
status of property owners. 190 In the regulatory takings context anti-subordination 
addresses the limits of the local democratic process by acknowledging that small 
groups of property owners will rarely have the political will or power to 
realistically challenge local government decisionmaking that limits their use of 
their property. Thus, the government's actions are considered tantamount to 
taking their property .191 
II. DEVELOPMENT DISAGREEMENTS IN THE SUBURBS 
A. The Struggle over the Right to Development 
Economic development is by no means limited to urban settings. In the 
older, declining suburbs, local government councils resort to economic 
development techniques previously found only in the cities. 192 In the newer, 
ever-expanding suburbs, the major issue is not only development but too much 
development. 193 Rural space is being paved over for new homes, commercial 
office parks, and retail projects. 194 State and local government efforts focus 
primarily on seeking to ameliorate the impact of development on open space, 
delicate ecosystems, and disappearing rural land. They seek to regulate, balance, 
or halt the development process. 195 Governmental efforts to restrict development 
and deployed. This in tum means that the anti-subordination objectives at the heart of CRT depend 
on reorganizing these institutional structures [and] reforming the legal doctrines that construct 
them."). 
189. But see James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 TEx. L. REv. 
211, 211-12 (1993 ) (arguing the Court has fled from substance and accusations of "Lochnering"). 
190. See discussion infra Part ill. 
191. As John Calmore argues, "the oppressed must use rights as attention grabbers and wedges 
.... In the context of collective conflict, the assertion of rights must be seen as claims to power, 
privileges, and resources." John O. Calmore, Critical Race Theory, Archie Shepp, and Fire Music: 
Securing an Authentic Intellectual Life in a Multicultural World, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2129, 2214 
(1992). 
192. See, e.g., County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004) (discussing the 
county's attempt to capitalize on its airport and follow the new aerotropolis approach to economic 
development by making transportation the hub of development). 
193. See JOELGARREAU, EDGE CITY: LIFE ON THE NEW FRONTIER 12 (1991)("Nowhere in the 
American national character, as it turns out, is there as deep a divide as that between our reverence 
for 'unspoiled' nature and our enduring devotion to 'progress. "'). 
194. See generally Robert W. Burchell & Naveed A. Shad, The Evolution of the Sprawl 
Debate in the United States, 5 HAsTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVTL. L. & POL'y 137 (1999). 
195. See, e.g., Capacity analysis plus exactions statute-FLA. STAT. ANN. § 163.3180 (West 
2006 & Supp. 2009) (enabling local governments to measure the adequacy of public facilities and 
restrict development that would exceed predicted levels of service, with exceptions for urban 
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have been controversial because they interfere with the development or 
investment expectations of property owners. A number of regulatory takings 
challenges centering around property owners rights to develop their properties 
have been decided by the U.S. Supreme Court, most recently in the Tahoe-
Sierra l96 and Lingle v. Chevron l97 decisions. 198 In comparison with the level of 
loss and disruption seen in the eminent domain context, the regulatory takings 
stories are less dramatic, less disruptive, and arguably less compelling. Yet the 
response and opposition to government regulation have been no less angry or 
spirited. At the heart of the regulatory takings decisions is a fundamental 
disagreement over interfering with development, and a heartfelt belief that 
property ownership includes a right to development. 
The Supreme Court's fact-specific regulatory takings doctrine has shifted 
back and forth in its responsiveness to property owners seeking the right to resist 
governmental regulation and develop their properties. Overall, however, the 
doctrine has been more responsive to property owners seeking the right to resist 
redevelopment and retain ownership of their properties. Although the doctrine 
has evolved imperfectly, its intention to solidify property-based boundaries 
against the intrusion of government decisionmaking has very clearly signaled to 
local governments that they should tread carefully when individual interests are 
in conflict with public need. 
Accordingly, the evolution of regulatory takings jurisprudence lays out one 
of the most consistent anti-subordination doctrines in modem law. Although the 
analysis is framed in terms of individual harm to individually held property 
rights, the Court's willingness to intervene on behalf of citizens in situations of 
great public need (i.e., environmental preservationl99) or to intervene where the 
personal harm is rather minimal and the matter is one of principle (e.g. the 
development or payments for improvements by developers); MD. CODE ANN., AGRIc. §§ 2-501 to 
-518 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008) (establishing the Maryland Agriculture Land Preservation 
Foundation with the power to create agricultural preservation areas and purchase agricultural land 
preservation easements); Urban Growth boundary-OR. REv. STAT. § 197.296 (West 2003 & Supp. 
2008) (establishing factors to measure the sufficiency of buildable lands within an urban growth 
boundary that is created based on residential distribution); Growth moratorium ordinance-Union 
County, N.C., Amendment to the Union County Land Use Ordinance Establishing a 12-Month 
Moratorium on Major Residential Development (Aug. 15, 2005, Extended July 25, 2006), available 
at http://www.co.union.nc.us/Portals/01PIanning/Agenda_Min/2006/PB_min06-20-06.pdf 
(establishing a twelve-month moratorium on residential development overtive dwelling units while 
the county creates an Adequate Public Facilities ordinance); Coastal protection-SANTA BARBARA 
COUNTY, CAL., COASTAL ZoNING ORDINANCE, ch. 35, art. II, § 35-50 (2004) (protecting, among 
other things, public access and quality of the environment through prohibition of dry sand 
development, easements between road and wet sand, and set-backs for bluff 
developments), available at http://www.sbcountyplanning.orglPDFlAIArtic\e%201l.pdf. 
196. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
197. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
198. See id. at 531; Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306. 
199. See, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 306. 
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principle of the right to exclude has been abrogated in a way that the Court finds 
objectionable2°O) provides a striking contrast to the eminent domain 
redevelopment cases. The Court is most interested not in the individual rights of 
the parties before the Court, but more generally in protecting property owners as 
a group from the public enterprise of government and the public needs of the 
general welfare. 
In particular, the doctrine of regulatory takings evolution reflects an 
imperfect, yet effective attempt to insulate private property owners from the 
structural inequities of the political process. In this process, the harms to a few 
or to consistently disadvantaged groups (in relation to the ability to affect 
governmental decisionmaking) suggest a structural disadvantaging of property 
rights in the face of increasingly complex and demanding public needs. Because 
the doctrine's evolution involved an attempt, albeit largely unsuccessful, to 
harden property rights protections by intervening to protect property owners 
based not on the extent of impact but on principle, the evolution of the regulatory 
takings doctrine suggests that regulatory takings is an anti-subordination 
doctrine. By creating a bulwark against the demands of public need, the doctrine 
implicitly supports individualism and withdrawal into private enclaves; it also 
activates the agency of suburban property owners by giving them a right to resist 
governmental decisionmaking.201 
The governmental projects of city and suburb are not unrelated. Fostering 
development in one setting and attempting to regulate, if not halt, development 
in another, takes place against a backdrop of each type of geographic area 
battling to obtain, retain, or manage middle-class residents.202 Both city and 
suburb, to the extent this binary distinction retains salience, are engaged in a 
battle for identity to ensure that they will both capture the middle- and upper-
middle class resident as well as establish themselves as the type of geographic 
area most associated with the social status, privilege, and power of affluent 
individuals.203 The geography of city and suburb is closely associated with 
200. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 531. 
201. The exclusionary zoning issue is based on this quest for some approximation of upper 
middle-class status. Zoning for the tax rate necessarily sets a premium on higher end incomes and 
residents. To the extent that race is associated with lower incomes in people's minds, the racial 
component of upper-middle-class identity is clear (regardless of the reality). SeeJ. Peter Byrne & 
Michael Diamond, Affordable Housing, Land Tenure, and Urban Policy: The Matrix Revealed, 
34 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 527, 528 (2007); Lee Anne Fennell, Exclusion's Attraction: Land Use 
Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in THE TlEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBUC 
ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 163, 172-77, 186-89 (William A. Fischel ed., 2006) 
(exploring motives for exclusion). 
202. See Maureen Kennedy & Paul Leonard, DEAUNG WITH NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGE: A 
PRiMER ON GENTRIACATION AND POUCY CHOICES I (2ool),availableathttp://www.brookings.eduJ 
reportsI2001l04metropolitanPolicy.aspx ("[A] new corps of mayors has made attracting middle-
and upper-income residents back to their cities a leading priority, to revitalize the tax base of their 
communities, the visibility of their neighborhoods and the vibrancy of their downtowns."). 
203. See J. ERIC OUVER, DEMOCRACY IN SUBURBIA 5 (2001) (arguing that suburbanization 
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maintaining an identity with particular spatial histories and configurations of 
property ownership or lack of ownership.204 Therefore, economic development, 
which is often predicated on attracting middle-class and affluent individuals by 
building or providing residential, commercial, and retail amenities that satisfy 
their consumption tastes, is in fact a battle to create a new identity for the city. 
Thus, battles in the suburban context over land use related to a notion of 
identity in the background of the struggle to retain the right to develop. For 
example, fee simple absolute bestows the ultimate in legal rights and protections 
against the encroachment of outsiders-people, the economy, and government. 
This property right helps to formulate and reflect one's identity. One's identity 
comes with an associated level of agency-that is, the ability to exercise free will 
with regard to decisions and actions. Therefore, identity and agency are two 
components of property-what one expects to receive by owning property. Both 
concepts are constitutive of one another as well as a means of achieving the 
other. Property ownership is ultimately intended to endow individuals with a 
certain amount of agency to exercise the "sticks" in the bundle of property 
rights-the right to use and enjoy, transfer, exclude; the right to be immune from 
expropriation or damage, the right to devise, and so on. Therefore, property 
doctrine conceives of denial of property rights as a denial of individual agency. 
Although this is recognized implicitly, it is important for understanding that 
regulatory takings doctrine requires an adequate consideration of these different 
dimensions of property ownership to create consistent doctrines to handle 
property ownership and residency across varying geographies. 
The fundamental ordering principle of regulatory takings doctrine is that 
sometimes regulation just "goes too far.,,205 This statement, made at the dawn of 
the judicial willingness to acknowledge and provide a remedy for the impacts of 
regulation on property owner agency, captures the essence of regulatory takings 
doctrine. The jurisprudence associated with the doctrine is a complex, highly 
contextual attempt to limit governmental regulation through an ad hoc fact-based 
process, from which is distilled the refuge that property ownership provides to 
citizens. Justice Holmes's famous statement reflects both an increasing 
sophistication in conceptualizing property rights and an evolution in thinking 
about such rights against the government's prerogative to protect the general 
welfare. The statement represents a shift from willful blindness of the impacts 
on citizens to an attempt to mediate between government and citizen. It turns on 
judicial gut-felt principles of fundamental fairness couched in the language of 
property rights. 
Regulatory takings doctrine represents a slow evolution in the idea of 
displaces social conflicts between citizens based on race and class into social conflicts between 
political institutions). 
204. It is not hard to picture geography and come up with an identity for the area-an 
economic class that will be associated with a particular racial identity. Although race does not 
always track class, more often than not, it does. See generally Lee Anne Fennell, Propenies of 
Concentration, 73 U. Cm. L. REv. 1227 (2006). 
205. Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415 (1922). 
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acknowledging different impacts of the government on citizens. If a citizen can 
point to a significant-enough impairment of a property that decreases the 
economic value of the property enough to be considered harmful, then it will be 
considered a taking. In one historical sense, this tracks a similar evolution in 
eminent domain law. At one time in some jurisdictions, the government merely 
took property and rarely, if ever, paid compensation.206 This was upheld by the 
courts in part because of ajudicial unwillingness to acknowledge the impacts on 
property owners for fear of interrupting the governmental project. It was also 
rationalized under the rubric of just compensation, which was considered a 
matter of opinion. This willful blindness gradually ended and eminent domain 
law and the regulatory takings concept evolved in tandem. First, eminent domain 
law acknowledged different kinds of actual seizures that require compensation. 
This led to acknowledging physical occupations directly connected to 
government activity that severely harmed landowners under the rationale of 
inverse condemnation. For example, flooding207 and blasting condemnation were 
recognized as unintentional indirect exercises of eminent domain accomplished 
through an affirmative government act. This idea was extended to include planes 
flying overhead as a significant-enough taking tantamount to physical 
occupation.208 At this point, regulatory takings concepts and eminent domain law 
diverged. Eminent domain doctrine remained steady for nearly fifty years with 
the Supreme Court adopting a deferential attitude towards the local government's 
exercise of eminent domain power. In contrast, regulatory takings doctrine 
reflects a less generous attitude towards the local government exercise of police 
power to manage the ill effects of development. 
B. Is There a Right to Development? Tracing the Court's Response 
to the Claim of the Right to Development 
The recent evolution in regulatory takings doctrine is difficult to characterize 
because each Supreme Court decision has seemed to signal a new direction. 
However, some general contextual observations are relevant. First, the suburbs 
rose and were created partly in response to the negatives of the city. Suburbs 
were a refuge from the city's crowded conditions and a sanctuary from the large 
bureaucracies controlled by ethnic immigrants and mob bosses. They were 
created in a quest for local control, for exclusion, and for the right to escape from 
all of the city's disadvantages. This quest to escape from disadvantage is an 
206. See generally Arthur McEvoy, Markets and Ethics in U.S. Property Law, in WHO OWNS 
AMERICA?: SOCIAL CONRlCf OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 94 (Harvey M. Jacobs ed., 1998) (brief 
historical description of early eminent domain law). 
207. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. 166, 177 (1871)( extreme form of physical intrusion 
is always a taking such as when a dam floods neighboring property). 
208. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256,267 (1946) (regular flights overhead by military 
aircraft held a taking); see also Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) 
(navigational servitude on pond housing private marina that involved actual physical invasion held 
a regulatory taking). 
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important dimension of the geographical context of regulatory takings decisions. 
Many regulatory takings cases reflect heightened privatized sensibilities about 
property rights, privilege, and affluence: the suburbs are designed for the 
affluent, who are usually able to buy their way out of urban disadvantages, social 
disorder, and redistribution imperatives from the heterogeneous society. 
Second, the regulatory takings cases reflect a struggle over whether 
development is a stick in the bundle of property rights. The underlying common 
claim has tended to center around a property owner's quest to develop his or her 
property. The regulatory takings cases illustrate a background debate in property 
law about whether the bundle of property rights includes "the right to develop." 
Some commentators are unequivocal in their conviction that there is a right to 
develop. In Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,209 the notion 
of a right to develop was rejected in favor of the concept of regulatory takings as 
protecting only "investment-backed" expectations of such magnitude that they 
outweighed the reasonableness of public regulation.210 Assertions of a right to 
development are implicit in most of the major Supreme Court regulatory takings 
decisions. Regulatory takings claims assert that the right to develop is an 
inviolable stick in the bundle of property rights. Regulatory takings doctrine has 
shown an indirect solicitousness of this desire to develop, which is consistent 
with a common law tradition that the right to develop is highly prized in 
American law.211 
Notwithstanding the acceptance of most, if not all, principles of English 
common law into the property doctrine of the United States, most states rejected 
English notions that did not fit with the new and developing character of the 
country.2I2 In Prah v. Maretti,2I3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that 
209. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
210. See Frank 1. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical 
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARv. L. REv. 1165, 1233-34 (1967) (citing Penn 
Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 104); see also Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 
(1992) (opining that the Court's '''takings' jurisprudence ... has traditionally been guided by the 
understandings of our citizens regarding the content of, and the State's power over, the 'bundle of 
rights' that they acquire when they obtain title to property"); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 
U.S. 164, 175 (1979) (using the term "reasonable investment backed expectations"); Daniel R. 
Mandelker, Investment-Backed Expectations: Is There a Taking?, 31 WASH. U. J. URB. & 
CONTEMP. L. 3,5-6 (1987) (questioning Penn Central's omission of the estoppel or vested rights 
doctrine as a natural limit to the extent of valid investment-backed expectations. Without these 
existing doctrinal limits, "the expectations taking factor introduces a landowner tilt to taking theory 
that did not exist before"). 
211. McEvoy, supra note 206, at 94 ("The law of property in the United States contains a 
profound bias toward developmental uses and against such nonmarket values as the health and 
welfare of communities that live on the land or, indeed, the ecological well-being of the land 
itself."). 
212. See, e.g., Dillman v. Hoffman, 38 Wis. 559, 574 (1875) ("In new states like this, the uses 
of land and of structures on land are more variable with the growth of population and business, than 
in England or the older states; and it might tend to impede sale and improvement of real property, 
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the common law rejection of a right to sunlight reflected the fact that the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries were a period of growth when change was 
expected:214 
As the city grows, large grounds appurtenant to residences must be cut 
up to supply more residences . . . . The cistern, the outhouse, the 
cesspool, and the private drain must disappear in deference to the public 
waterworks and sewer; the terrace and the garden, to the need for more 
complete occupancy . . . . Strict limitation [on the recognition of 
easements of light and air over adjacent premises is] in accord with the 
popular conception upon which real estate has been and is daily being 
conveyed in Wisconsin and to be essential to easy and rapid 
development at least of our municipalities.215 
Direct restraints on alienation have also been disfavored by the courts for 
development reasons: 
Another evil growing out of a restraint is its effect to discourage 
improvements when it is imposed upon an interest in land. A landowner 
will be reluctant to make improvements upon land that he cannot sell 
during the period of restraint, which may be a long term of years, or even 
his whole life. In many instances, therefore, the restraint deters the 
owner of land from obtaining the maximum enjoyment of it; it may also 
retard the development of a particular section of the community .... If 
a substantial portion of our land were subject to restraints upon 
alienation, the resultant effect upon social and economic life would be 
serious.216 
Laws designed to restrict development merely to preserve open land, natural 
resources or wildlife are a significant departure from, if not a repudiation of, the 
orientation of American property law.217 A good portion of regulatory takings 
if old uses of soil or buildings should be too easily placed beyond the power of owners by 
easements implied by conveyances in their chains of title. "); see also Fountainebleau Hotel Corp. 
v. Forty-Five Twenty-Five, 114 So. 2d 357,359 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1959) (allowing a hotel tower 
to block the pool and beach of neighboring hotel, rejecting an easement for light and air on the 
rationale that the English doctrine of ancient lights was rejected in the United States). 
213. 321 N.W.2d 182 (Wis. 1982). 
214. See, e.g., id. at 236. 
215. See id. at 189 (quoting Miller v. Hoeschler, 105 N.W. 790, 791 (Wis. 1905»; see also 
Depner v. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 232 N.W. 851, 852 (Wis. 1930). The nuisance cases further illustrate 
the law's common pronouncements on development; the way in which the doctrine has been 
defined and applied has encouraged unimpeded development. See Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 
U.S. 394, 404 (1915); Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706 (Ariz. 1972); 
Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. 1970). 
216. White v. White, 251 A.2d 470, 473-74 (N.J .. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1969) (quoting 6 
AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 26.3, at 413-14). 
217. McEvoy, supra note 206, at 101-02. (Early ''traditional common-law restrictions on 
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doctrine represents an attempt to maintain consistency with the past or traditional 
presumptions in favor of development. 218 The claim that the government has no 
right to bother someone on his or her property only works with the implicit rural 
assumption that what one does on private land does not affect others. As the 
nation has developed, it has become more difficult for a property owner to argue 
that what one does on his or her own property does not affect others in terms of 
open land availability or unique types of property. Therefore, the presumption 
towards development is no longer as universally beneficial or a matter of life and 
death it once was. Similarly, the claim that one can hide on his or her land and 
do anything one wants is not true. Thus, property is not immune from societal 
interests. 
The third general observation is that the ad hoc, factually based analysis of 
the competing interests of property owner and government has resulted in a 
doctrinally complex shifting back-and-forth in case outcomes. Although volumes 
have been written about the imperfections and contradictions in the rules 
announced in these cases, anyone who steps backs and looks at the cases will see 
a relatively consistent evolution of regulatory takings reasoning since 1987. That 
evolution reveals the Supreme Court's emphasis on an additional analytical 
construct focusing on whether an aspect or dimension of property rights has been 
impaired.219 This conceptual severance approach is further divided in two. The 
first is the categorical rule, under which a particular impact on a property owner 
is always a taking. The second imposes an intermediate heightened scrutiny 
standard in situations where the Court perceives inequality of bargaining 
power.220 In other words, the most predictable factor in the varied outcomes221 
seems to be the way in which the takings question is framed from the property 
owner's perspective or from the government's perspective. The resulting takings 
inquiry therefore emphasizes one side's interest and minimizes the other. In 
Armstrong v. United States,222 Justice Brown offered the classic rationale for 
equating certain exercises of governmental regulatory power with the eminent 
domain power: the purpose of the notion of takings is "to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
property ownership for centuries had limited the uses to which individual owners could put their 
property ... so as to preserve the stability of the traditional agrarian economy over the long run . 
. . . In the early nineteenth century, many of these traditional restrictions fell away as American 
courts overturned these 'anti-developmental' property rules and replaced them with market-
oriented, pro-development doctrines so as to encourage what the legal historian J. Willard Hurst 
(1956) called the 'release of entrepreneurial energy."'). 
218. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003,1005 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 827 (1987). 
219. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019. 
220. See, e.g., Dolan, 512 U.S. at 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 825. 
221. See generally John Martinez, A Critical Analysis of the 1987 Takings Trilogy: The 
Keystone, Nollan and First English Cases, 1 HOFSTRA PRoP. LJ. 39 (1988). 
222. 364 U.S. 40 (1960). 
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justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.,,223 
Eminent domain involves the claim of taking the right to keep one's property. 
This is not merely a compensation issue, but also a takings issue. Regulatory 
takings doctrine evaluates the right to use one's property and the extent of the 
right to the highest and best use of land and to create new economic value from 
land. The Court's intention has been to protect the ability of property owners to, 
in effect, resist governmental decisionmaking in two ways. First, this is 
accomplished by providing additional protection against arbitrary 
decisionmaking and affirming well-considered planning that is neither arbitrary 
nor capricious where there is average reciprocity of advantage. The second way 
is by ensuring that particular owners have not been singled-out for arbitrary 
treatment. The way in which the Penn Central Court conducted its ad hoc fact-
based analysis of the claim is quite instructive. It illustrates the different 
dimensions of the inquiry into when government regulation has gone too far and 
property rights have been impaired. 
C. Regulatory Takings Analysis of the Political Process Through a 
Government Lens 
The aspect of the takings claim considered most salient is the economic 
impact of the regulation. According to the Court, a diminution in value has to be 
substantial in order to distinguish it from the ubiquitous economic impact 
attendant with most government land regulation. In other words, mere 
diminution in value, standing alone, cannot establish a taking.224 Instead, 
diminution in value must be combined with "something else," to amount to a 
taking. That "something else" could be, for example, being singled out for 
discriminatory treatment.225 In Penn Central, because the challenged landmark 
law was part of a comprehensive plan of land use regulation,226 it could not 
involve a singling out or "few are burdened" problem.227 
The pure property rights approach to taking would be to conceive of the 
223. See id. at 49; see also Michelman, supra note 210, at 1216-17 (discussing being subject 
to the control of political majorities as a compensable occasion). 
224. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 131 (1978). 
225. Singling out touches on the Equal Protection dimension of takings analysis. See Nollan, 
483 U.S. at 835 n.4. 
226. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 438 U.S. at 132 ("[L]andmark laws are not like discriminatory, 
or 'reverse spot,' zoning: that is, a land-use decision which arbitrarily singles out a particular parcel 
for different, less favorable treatment than the neighboring ones.") (emphasis added). The opinion's 
reference to discrimination through reverse-spot zoning suggests that diminution in value arguments 
must be accompanied by an arbitrary unjustified decision or in other words, diminution in value 
must present a substantive due process problem. Otherwise, diminution in value standing alone 
with a regulation with a substantial relationship to a legitimate government purpose that's pan of 
a comprehensive set of regulations will not constitute a taking. 
227. /d. at 133; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394,409 (1915); Miller v. Hoeschler, 105 
N. W. 790, 792 (Wis. 1905). Disparate severity of impact is not enough to establish singling out. 
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taken property as the entirely distinct property right, in the form of Penn 
Central's air rights and the owner's expectations to have use of those property 
rights for economic gain. The Court rejected this "conceptual severance" claim 
that 100% of the air rights had been taken, articulating instead a "parcel as a 
whole" rule: 
"Taking" jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete 
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular segment 
have been entirely abrogated. In deciding whether a particular 
governmental action has effected a taking, this Court focuses rather both 
on the character of the action and on the nature and extent of the 
interference with rights in the parcel as a whole .... 228 
Takings doctrine, however, indirectly acknowledges certain property 
expectations as a cognizable loss of a stick in the bundle of property rights. First, 
a claim of deprivation of a discrete property interest can escape the 
unacceptability of being a conceptual severance claim when there are distinct 
investment-backed expectations.229 Second, the Court acknowledged property 
expectations when it supported the landmarks law by reasoning that the plaintiffs 
were not harmed because the regulation did not interfere with the present uses; 
they could continue to use the property as they were and earn a reasonable return 
on their investment. According to the Court, this case was not even as 
sympathetic as other cases in which the governmental acts interfered with the 
present uses of the properties, and yet no taking was found. 230 Because the law 
does not interfere with what must be regarded as Penn Central's primary 
expectation concerning the use of the parcel,23I then the claim must be rejected. 
Of course, this reasoning ignores that Penn Central argued for a right to develop, 
a right to create new value out of its property. 
Also instructive of the takings principles important to the ad hoc analysis is 
the imperfect, transferable development rights program, offered in the landmarks 
law as some sort of offset or compensation for Penn Central. 232 This reasoning 
seems contradictory, particularly since the opinion rejected the argument that any 
228. 438 U.S. at 130-31. 
229. The reference to those expectations actually was mentioned in an attempt to distinguish 
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon's acceptance of a conceptual severance claim by characterizing that 
decision as being about "distinct investment-backed expectations" and by implication, not about 
conceptual severance. [d. at 127 (citing Pa. Coal Co.v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393,415-16 (1922) 
(Mahon is "the leading case for the proposition that a state statute that substantially furthers 
important public policies may so frustrate distinct investment-backed expectations as to amount to 
a 'taking."'). 
230. 438 U.S. at 136 ("Unlike the governmental acts in Goldblatt, Miller, Causby, Griggs, and 
Hadacheck, the New York City law does not interfere in any way with the present uses of the 
Terminal .... [A]ppellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for the 
past 65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions."). 
231. [d. 
232. [d. at 137. 
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regulatory takings had occurred because diminution in value standing alone was 
not enough of a basis for a takings claim. However, this prong of the opinion 
actually relates more to the reasonableness of the program-that government had 
sought to be somewhat accommodating and attempted to ameliorate, albeit 
imperfectly, the impact of the regulation. Although not required to do so in order 
to pass muster under a takings analysis, it bolstered the planning that went into 
crafting the regulatory program-it had tried to be fair. In other words, where 
the regulation is substantially related to the promotion of the general welfare233 
and the present uses are not impaired, and a claim of negative economic impact 
stands alone without substantive due process violations, there is no taking. 
Primary expectations or investment-backed expectations are not impaired.234 
The overall lesson of Penn Central with respect to development 
disagreements is to defer to the government's exercise of police power. The 
decision announced a rule that was intended to definitively signal that takings 
analysis was to be deferential to exercises of governmental regulatory power if 
certain conditions existed to ensure that the decision was not arbitrary, and 
exercises of regulatory power are presumed to contain no substantive due process 
violations where the challenged regulation was part of a well-considered plan. 
This government-focused regulatory takings decision thus shows a presumption 
of the validity of government regulation. Nevertheless, the no-takings calculus 
also pays attention to attempts to be fair as part of the reasonableness calculation. 
Concrete and demonstrable attempts to be fair by addressing legitimate property 
expectations are part of the calculation of the reasonableness of a redevelopment 
scheme. 
D. Regulatory Takings and Development Disagreements from the 
Property-Owner's Perspective-Conceptual Severance Revisited 
The flip side of the government-focused regulatory takings analysis is the 
property rights-based analysis and a receptiveness to conceptual severance-
focusing on whether an aspect or dimension of property rights has been 
impaired.235 The conceptual severance approach is further divided into two 
approaches. The first is the categorical approach under which a particular impact 
on a property owner is always a taking. The second is to impose an intermediate, 
heightened scrutiny standard in situations where the Court perceives inequality 
of bargaining power.236 
233. [d. at 127, 138. 
234. The Court later deviated from this government-focused deferential, anti-conceptual 
severance, severe impact combined with arbitrary government decisionmaking take on regulatory 
takings in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982), which 
resorted to a categorical rule based on a conceptual severance claim of physical occupation. This 
claim was then not acknowledged to be a conceptual severance claim, but viewed as a physical 
occupation claim. [d. at 427. 
235. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
236. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 
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The cases illustrate that strong property owner protections are not easily 
reconcilable with deference to government prerogatives or government 
judgments. For example, the opinion in Kaiser v. Aetna,237 though contradictory 
and more of an illustration of results-oriented jurisprudence, is instructive of the 
relevant property rights interests when considering takings claims from the 
property owner's perspective. These include the right to exclude, property 
owners expectations, and detrimental reliance. Of these, the right to exclude and 
the owner's substantial financial investment were the predominant concerns.238 
Any precedent for deference to government was eliminated by the government's 
supposed complicity in the owner's investment. Granting a dredging permit, 
which was an implied consent to the investment. 239 Kaiser's overall lesson is that 
government complicity in creating or allowing an investment equitably estops the 
government from retreating from supporting that investment. In the 
redevelopment and gentrification context, this suggests that the individuals 
driven out were those encouraged to invest in the city by the City. Because they 
held the city together a protectible property interest in remaining in the 
community, seeing that investment and commitment come to fruition, or 
continuing to enjoy that investment should be acknowledged. 
1. Conceptual Severance and Investment Backed Expectations from the 
Property Owner's Perspective.-Notwithstanding Penn Central's rejection of 
conceptual severance, the Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal 
Commission240 looked at the matter from the property owner's perspective. The 
Court regarded the loss of even a strand in the bundle of property rights as very 
important.241 In particular, the right to decide to retain ownership is as 
fundamental to property ownership as any other right.242 The property owner was 
prevented from developing two small parcels of land with attractive use value 
and lucrative development potential as residential beachfront property?43 The 
case squarely confronted the question of what to do about the competing goals 
of development and wanting to maximize financial investment for profit and the 
483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
237. 444 U.S. 164 (1979). 
238. [d. at 174-75. 
239. Though oriented to the interests of the property owner, the Kaiser majority opinion was 
consistent with Penn Central, that there was no real balancing of the competing interests. No 
deference could eliminate the problem that, in the majority's view, a compensable property interest 
had been impaired. This is consistent with both the Loretto line of cases which are called physical 
takings, as well as part of Penn Central by its emphasis on the economic impact; interference with 
investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government regulation. 
240. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003. 
241. [d. at 1027. 
242. [d. at 1028-29. 
243. In keeping with the view that our vision of property's value and the most important stick 
in the bundle being the right to exclude, in the early nineteenth century, the beach was referred to 
as a wasteland; its aesthetic use value was not fully appreciated by anyone at all. See Pierson v. 
Post, 3 CaL R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). 
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goal of environmental preservation. Though situated in the hardened framework 
of property rights analysis, the underlying question was, what does fairness 
dictate? 
Lucas's inability to exploit the economic potential of the land by developing 
his parcel was equated to the "essential right to exclude stick" in the bundle of 
property rights. Thus, the Court found a balancing approach to the takings 
question inappropriate because the severe impact on the property owner trumped 
the governmental interest. 244 Deference to governmental regulation "d[id] not 
apply to the relatively rare situations where the government has deprived a 
landowner of all economically beneficial uses.,,245 Instead, categorical treatment 
was necessary. Although it took much logical work to supportably reach this 
conclusion,246 the result was a categorical rule for takings where there was 
elimination of value. It is difficult to imagine, however, what regulatory 
circumstance would result in a hundred percent elimination of property value.247 
As in all regulatory takings cases, the real issue not addressed in Lucas is the 
development disagreement. The whole doctrine of regulatory takings has been 
raised around the question of whether the government can impose regulatory 
harm on a property owner. Yet, the question is impossible to resolve sensibly 
because the issue is framed in competing versions of the doctrine.248 Once the 
issue goes past physical appropriation, any takings analysis runs into the 
overwhelming power and interest in governance contained in police power. 
Property owners are supposed to protect their interests through the democratic 
process. By declaring that certain property rights always trump government 
regulation that is otherwise not corrupt or arbitrary or capricious,249 regulatory 
takings analysis in effect acknowledges the shortcomings of the local political 
process. The Court in Lucas used property law to give property owners an "out" 
from disagreements over development, thus, in effect, creating a "right to 
development." Using property law to mediate with government on behalf of 
property owners in this manner specifically fails to acknowledge the subjective, 
gut-based, substantive decision made about what are fair property owner 
expectations and what are fair, or unfair, government actions.25o 
244. Interestingly, Lucas is really a temporary takings case. The Beachfront Management Act 
was amended to allow for special permits in 1990, two years after the complained of 1988 
amendments, yet the Court proceeded to decide the case because Lucas would be denied a remedy 
for the two years during which he had been denied the ability to build. Thus, there was temporal 
conceptual severance in this case. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1012. 
245. ld. at 1017. 
246. ld. at 1022-23, 1025 n.12, 1027, 1031. 
247. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302,321-22 
(2002) (discussing the rareness of 100% elimination of value). 
248. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1003; Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 
104 (1978). 
249. See, e.g., City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 754 
n.l3 (1999). 
250. Even more so, beyond this lack of acknowledgment, there has been a decision to protect 
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Instead, the Lucas Court responded to the development versus preservation 
dilemma by fashioning an unworkable categorical rule that total elimination of 
value was a per se taking unless justified by common law understandings from 
the nineteenth century. This is a significant example of a masked exercise of 
substantive due process. The decision attempted to structure legal doctrine as a 
bulwark against any justification for modern governmental decisionmaking that 
might retard land development. The decision therefore embraced a right to 
development and acknowledged it as part of the expectation of land ownership. 
The increasing economic value of land, not for its productive features, such as 
agriculture, but for its use features as a place of residence or commerce, raises 
the question, what happens if land is no longer available under government 
regulation for the desired use? In some ways, the Court's approach is not without 
precedent and makes perverse sense. As discussed above, the common law of 
this country has traditionally promoted the free use and development of land.25 \ 
Today, it seems that the community's expectation ofland has evolved such that 
an expected right to development-regardless of whether it is in fact a right-has 
been granted increasing recognition by the Supreme Court. Recognizing 
community standards for this evolving economic expectation certainly has 
implications for the urban side of eminent domain law. In particular, would a 
categorical rule be called for in certain exigent circumstances when there is a 
political process failure in the eminent domain context? 
2. Inequality of Bargaining Power and Political Process Failure in the 
Context of Development: Heightened Scrutiny and Expectation.-The Nollan 
v. California Coastal Commission252 and Dolan v. City ofTigar~53 decisions are 
regulatory takings cases that deal directly with development disputes between 
property owners seeking to expand the development of their properties and the 
difficulty of negotiating with government. In both cases, the right to cross 
someone's land in return for the right to develop was subjected to heightened 
scrutiny and held to a strict means-ends standard of fairness and appropriateness. 
In both cases, the Court intervened and elevated the individual's right to be free 
economically beneficial uses; while this sounds hard and fast, it is an arbitrary selection to the 
benefit of the property owner. This is seemingly consistent with the eminent domain reliance on 
fair market value to compensate owners even when there is significant personal loss, except that 
concept is to the benefit of the government. See Lynda J. Oswald, Cornering the Quark: 
Investment-Backed Expectations and Economically Viable Uses in Takings Analysis, 70 WASH. L. 
REv. 91, 123 (1995). 
251. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 413-14 (1915) (no taking when 
prohibited activity could be performed elsewhere). But see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1059 (Blackmun, 
J., dissenting) ("[S]tate courts historically have been less likely to find that a government action 
constitutes a taking when the affected land is undeveloped .... [T]he power of the legislature to 
take unimproved land without proper compensation was [also] sanctioned by 'ancient rights and 
principles."') (emphasis added) (quoting Lindsay v. Comm'rs, 2 S.C.L. 38, 57 (S.c. Ct. App. 
1796))) (emphasis added). 
252. NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
253. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
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from the Government's strong-arming in negOtiatIOns to a constitutionally 
protected property right. Both Nollan and Dolan were analyzed from the 
property owner's perspective with no balancing of the competing interests. 
The Nollans's desire to enlarge a tiny, dilapidated, single-story bungalow 
along the California coast into a two-story, three-bedroom house with a two-car 
garage was restricted by California's strict regulation of coastal development.254 
The grant of the Nollans' application for a coastal development permit was 
conditioned upon their provision of "lateral access to the public beaches in the 
form of an easement across their property.,,255 They claimed that this condition 
constituted a taking of their property,256 and the Court was receptive to their 
claim.257 The Commission's requirement of an easement as a condition to 
receiving the coastal permit meant that the substance of the permit requirement 
compromised the right to exclude.258 Also, the manner of acquiring the easement 
violated the Fourteenth Amendment by using an improper unilateral form of 
bargaining. 259 
The Nollan opinion seems to have utilized a substantive due process analysis 
whereby the Court's consideration of the existence of a taking was necessarily 
informed by a disagreement with the nature of the underlying regulation.260 The 
opinion begins with the observation: "We have long recognized that land-use 
regulation does not effect a taking if it 'substantially advance[s] legitimate state 
interests' and does not' den[y] an owner economically viable use of his land.' ,,261 
"[U]nless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the 
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but 
'an out and out plan of extortion. ",262 Consistent with the "substantially 
advances" prong of the Agins v. Tiburon test263 (now repudiated in Lingle v. 
Chevron264), the Court announced an "essential nexus" standard for such 
254. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 827-29. 
255. Id. at 829. ''The Commission ... had similarly conditioned 43 out of 60 coastal 
development permits along the same tract of land." [d. 
256. Id. 
257. [d. at 836. 
258. See id. at 831-32. 
259. [d. at 832. 
260. See id. at 838-39. 
261. Id. at 834 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by 
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 529 (2005». The difference in the formulation of the 
Agins standard is striking. In Lucas, the Court used an "or" formulation which supported the 
conclusion that diminution in value standing alone was enough for a regulatory takings. In this 
case, the "and" standard is conveniently supportive of the means-end test formulated by the Court. 
262. /d. at 837 (quotingJ.E.D. Assoc., Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981»; see 
also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 387 (1994) (further characterizing the permit condition 
as "gimmickry"). 
263. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron 
U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
264. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
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conditions and found that this condition failed the test. 265 
Nollan appears to be primarily about the Supreme Court reacting protectively 
to an inequality of bargaining power between local government and citizens who 
wish to develop. The Court sought to weigh in on behalf of the property 
owner.266 This is colorfully illustrated by the majority opinion's use of terms like 
"extortion,,267 and "leveraging of the police power.,,268 To extort is defined as "to 
obtain from a person by force, intimidation or undue or illegal power.,,269 The 
particular impact on the property owner, of being required to convey a property 
interest like an easement as the condition for obtaining a permit to develop, was 
deemed to present the "heightened risk that the purpose is avoidance of the 
compensation requirement, rather than the stated police-power objective.'027o 
Under the articulated standard in the case, the propriety of this decision could 
only be reached by the Court's eschewing the deferential standard of the 
"reasonable relationship test" and adopting a higher standard such as 
"substantially advances a legitimate governmental interest."27I Thus, the 
proposed bargain, impacting the right to exclude imposed by the government, 
was, at best, suggestive of a substantive due process violation. 
Requiring the government to provide a precise connection between the 
increased impact of the proposed development and the permit condition makes 
sense only in the abstract, removed from the actual context of governing. In 
reality, the government is responsible for meeting multiple, often conflicting 
public needs. Coastal protection perfectly reflects the tradeoffs between many 
public needs.272 Because government has to accommodate many interests, and 
has accommodated many interests in the past, the opinion does not explain why 
government cannot juggle these many accommodations by offsetting the 
management of one while obtaining a concession on the other.273 In other words, 
if visual access is decreased, why can the government not compensate for that 
decrease, or balance out that decrease by securing another concession that would 
be otherwise beneficial to the public? Although beach access in no way 
compensates for the loss of view, it shifts the public rights and public benefits in 
265. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
266. See id. at 839. 
267. Id. at 837. 
268. Id. at 837 n.5. 
269. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COUEGIATE DICfIONARY 440 (1991). 
270. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 84l. 
271. But see Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 532 (2005) (explicitly repudiating 
the "substantially advances" heightened standard of review in regulatory takings cases). The 
opinion states that the Court considers Nollan good law as an unconstitutional condition requiring 
a person to give up a constitutional right in return for some government action. Id. at 546; see Mark 
Fenster, Regulating Land Use in a Constitutional Shadow: The Institutional Contexts ojExactions, 
58 HASTINGS L.J. 729,730-31 (2007) (arguing that "exactions decisions sit uneasily alongside .. 
. Lingle to make sense of its long, confusing line of takings decisions"). 
272. See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1009-10 (1992). 
273. See Nolan, 483 U.S. at 825. 
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a way that is beneficial to the pUblic.274 Narrowly viewing the issue as a loss of 
a strand from the bundle of rights-the right to exclude-ignores this very 
compelling context and allows property owners to narrowly conceive of and 
enforce their property rights, regardless of public concessions that secure and 
enhance these property rights. 275 
Nollan involved homeowners who were opposed to sharing the beach with 
the public and a Court that agreed they were right to object. The Court disagreed 
that the government should be able to do anything short of a forced purchase to 
impair that expectation of immunity from public access across their property, 
even where economic injury does not exist.276 The Court considered it 
unconscionable for government to use its regulatory might to allow strangers to 
occupy one's land. How did an easement get equated with quartering troops on 
one's land if the impact was minimal at best? The Court's willingness to 
acknowledge impairment of the landowners' agency to exercise a right is 
apparent. Also evident was a sense that fundamental fairness was violated 
because the government always has more muscle to win. Thus, Nollan stands for 
the principle that there is a fundamental right not to be strong-armed by 
government because of the unequal bargaining power between citizen and 
government. 277 This is a neo-classic concern with the inequality of bargaining 
274. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion points out the obvious reciprocity of advantage view 
of this case: 
[The] development obviously significantly increases the value of appellants' property; 
appellants make no contention that this increase is offset by any diminution in value 
.... Furthermore, appellants ... benefit from the ... permit condition program. They 
are able to walk along the beach beyond the confines of their own property only 
because the Commission has required deed restrictions as a condition of approving 
other new beach developments. 
[d. at 856 (Brennan, I., dissenting). 
275. J. David Breemer, The Evolution of the "Essential Nexus": How State and Federal 
Courts Have Applied Nollan and Dolan and Where They Should Go from Here, 59 WASH. & LEE 
L. REv. 373 (2002); Lee Ann Fennell, Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions 
Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REv. I (2000); Mark Fenster, Takings Formalism and Regulatory Formulas: 
Exactions and the Consequences of Clarity, 92 CAL. L. REv. 609 (2004); see also Carlson & Pollak, 
supra note 16, at 115-16 (study indicating "Nollan and Dolan penalize ad hoc decisions to impose 
exactions ... but may actually encourage the imposition of higher impact fees"). 
276. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 857 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Ultimately, appellants' claim of 
economic injury is flawed because it rests on the assumption of entitlement to the full value of their 
new development. Appellants submitted a proposal for more intensive development of the coast, 
which the Commission was under no obligation to approve, and now argue that a regulation 
designed to ameliorate the impact of that development deprives them of the full value of their 
improvements. Even if this novel claim were somehow cognizable, it is not significant. '[T]he 
interest in anticipated gains has traditionally been viewed as less compelling than other 
property-related interests."') (quoting Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66 (1979)). 
277. The view that it is the impact on a few for the benefit of the many fails to explain the 
outcome. It seems instead there is a sense of entitlement to have a beach house consistent with 
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power. The Court is in effect saying that imposing standards to make the 
exercise of unequal power fair is important. These standards are usually read 
into contracts between individuals, where one is poor, uneducated, and unaware 
of his or her rights, or is desperate enough to waive fundamental rights and make 
deals that are detrimental to his or her interests. Here, the citizens are affluent, 
educated, and aware of their rights, and are arguably making a deal that benefits 
their interests. Nevertheless, this bargaining inequality is inimical in the Court's 
view and demands the Court's intervention.278 
In Lingle v. Chevron,279 the Court used a challenge to a gas service station 
regulation capping rents, which did not involve a regulatory taking, to clarify 
regulatory takings doctrine and the appropriateness of substantive due process 
reasoning. The Court repudiated any suggestion that substantive due process 
analysis belonged in regulatory takings doctrine.28o The Court attributed the 
source of the doctrinal confusion to be Agins v. City of Tiburon 'S281 "substantially 
advances" standard which used an impermissibly heightened means-ends test.282 
Though Nollan (and Dolan) used the substantially advances test, the Court 
identified a new source of precedent that supported those decisions. According 
to the Court, these cases could survive decoupling from Agins's heightened 
substantive standard by viewing them as drawing their rationale from another line 
of doctrine known as "unconstitutional conditions.,,283 This ad hoc line of cases 
prohibits government from conditioning receipt of some benefit upon the 
surrender of a constitutional right. Curiously, the constitutional rights protected 
in prior "unconstitutional conditions" cases involved civil rights like freedom of 
speech and religion. Nollan and Dolan represent the first set of cases to equate 
property rights with fundamental civil rights.284 
Notwithstanding Lingle's attempt to inoculate Nollan and Dolan from the 
heightened means/end test, the Nollan essential nexus test, and the rough 
proportionality standard, the opinions are clear in expressing a judicial 
disagreement with the underlying reasons advanced for the exaction or condition 
posed by the legislation. Thus, both Nollan and Dolan provide a detailed and 
difficult analytic regime for municipalities to provide a factual basis for their 
affluent expectations of privacy and exclusion of the public. 
278. See City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 703-04 
(1999) (upholding a $1.45 million jury verdict for landowners where they sought to develop an 
ocean-front parcel, but were impeded by arbitrary delay and denial by local government). 
279. 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
280. Id. at 545-48. 
281. 447 U.S. 255 (1980), abrogated by Lingle, 544 U.S. 528. 
282. See Jane B. Baron, Winding Toward the Heart o/the Takings Muddle: Kelo, Lingle and 
Public Discourse About Private Property, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 613, 637 (2007). 
283. Lingle, 544 U.S. at 547-48. 
284. See ROBERT B. ST ANDLER, DOCTRINE OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL CONDmONS IN THE USA 
3 (2005), available at http://www.rbs2.comlduc.pdf (summarizing the cases and articles about 
unconstitutional conditions). 
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legislative decisions.285 The Court's opinion provides a detailed analytic regime 
for municipalities to prove the validity of their legislative decision.286 
Dolan is a more sober and balanced opinion than Nollan. It is written from 
both the government's and the property owner's perspectives because the case 
had to venture where Nollan did not. The Dolan Court acknowledged the right 
of the government to regulate and define the connection between the condition 
and the government regulation, thus defining how far this exaction regulation 
could gO.287 The question turned upon whether the supporting "findings [were] 
constitutionally sufficient to justify the conditions imposed by the city on 
petitioner's building permit.,,288 After surveying various state standards, the 
Court stated it was selecting the intermediate standard requiring a reasonable 
relationship, which it translated to mean a standard of "rough proportionality." 
"No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make some 
sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is related both 
in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.,,289 
The Court invalidated the conditions for failing the first prong of essential 
nexus290 and failure of rough proportionality.29I Though this opinion was 
arguably more balanced than Nollan, it suffers from the same substantive defect. 
The Court was influenced by gut-felt fundamental fairness principles in 
fashioning the unprecedented "rough proportionality" standard. Moreover, the 
Court refused to "cut local government any slack," instead holding them to an 
exacting and expensive standard of justifying government actions with very 
precise studies individually tailored to the impacts of individual property owners. 
Although such studies can only come at great cost, it is possible to find a 
consultant to conduct studies to support one's actions. This requirement of 
"more paper" signals that the Supreme Court was willing to intervene to equalize 
the bargaining power between government and citizen by raising the costs of 
justifying what were likely well-founded exercises of regulatory power in 
285. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 
U.S. 825 (1987). But see generally D. Benjamin Barros, At Last, Some Clarity: The Potential 
Long-Term Impact of Lingle v. Chevron and the Separation of Takings and Substantive Due 
Process, 69 ALB. L. REv. 343 (2005). 
286. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391, 398 (rough proportionality and individualized determination); 
Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837 ("essential nexus"). 
287. Dolan, 512 U.S. at 388 ("[W]hether the degree of the exactions demanded by the city's 
permit conditions bears the required relationship to the projected impact of petitioner's proposed 
development." (citing NoHan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987»). 
288. Id. at 389. 
289. Id. at 391. 
290. Id. at 394-95 ("We conclude that the findings upon which the city relies do not show the 
required reasonable relationship between the floodplain easement and the petitioner's proposed new 
building."). 
291. /d. at 395-96 ("No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must make 
some effort to quantify its findings in support of the dedication for the pedestrian/bicycle pathway 
beyond the conclusory statement that it could offset some of the traffic demand generated."). 
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furtherance of the public welfare. The Dolan decision imposed an impediment 
that could slow the government down and limit the scope of what it could 
accomplish through exactions. Where a property owner substantially disagrees 
with the exercise of a governmental regulatory power, Dolan tipped the balance 
of power between government and citizen in favor of the citizen as property 
owner. 
The most striking aspect of the implicit role of unequal bargaining power in 
the Supreme Court's property rights jurisprudence is that the property owners do 
not fit the profile of people who are typically protected under the inequality of 
bargaining power rationale. The owners are neither uneducated, disabled, 
elderly, or impoverished. They are, in fact, the opposite-owners of lucrative 
pieces of real estate who are able to reach the Supreme Court to vindicate rights 
based on principle rather than on irreparable or severe harm.292 What about these 
property owners triggers the inequality of bargaining power scrutiny? It can only 
be the view of the government as an overly powerful entity that poses threats to 
property owners beyond the ability of any individual property owner to address 
their complaints or concerns through the political process. Because the opinions 
are silent about the need or ability of property owners to seek redress through the 
political process, the Court then may be led to believe such processes to be 
unavailing or too costly.293 
In effect, the Nollan and Dolan cases evince a concern that property owners 
who wish to develop have been singled out. While this singling-out is not of any 
great economic detriment, it raises Fourteenth Amendment Due Process concerns 
by interfering with the property owner's expectation to exploit the economic 
potential of his or her property. The categorical rules signal that it is arbitrary 
and capricious or unreasonable for the government to thwart the desire or 
expectations of a property owner who seeks to develop, merely because the 
owner is fortunate enough to own beachfront or waterfront property, as in Dolan. 
Thus, the regulatory takings cases represent the landed privileged who should 
essentially be immune from disadvantage because they own desirable land. The 
privileges and benefits that attend to this form of property ownership are 
particularly troublesome to the Court.294 Apparently privileged property 
ownership should be more protected from government interference or from the 
needs of the public. 
E. Implications of Attempting to Split the Difference in Perspective 
Between Government and Property Owner: Reigning in the 
Categorical but Maintaining the Warning to Government 
In Tahoe-Sierra, the Court returned to the government-focused analysis of 
regulatory takings cases.295 The decision reflects the Court's struggle to mediate 
292. See id. at 379; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-30. 
293. See generally Dolan, 512 U.S. 374; Nollan, 483 U.S. 825. 
294. See, e.g., Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32. 
295. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002). 
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a balance between the two approaches in simultaneous retreat from, but 
acceptance of, the more property-based approach to regulatory takings. The 
retreat results from recognition that the natural trajectory of the stronger 
property-based takings decisions like Lucas296 and First English297 presented 
administrability problems. The Court's refusal to overrule any property-based 
precedent signals that governments should take note and be careful in land use 
regulation. 
Tahoe-Sierra reflects the battle between Penn Central's balancing approach 
to takings and the combination of First English and Lucas gut-satisfying, 
categorical, conceptual severance approach to takings.298 The Tahoe-Sierra 
property owners were apparently powerless to affect a very complex and 
technical planning and political process. In some ways, their only leverage was 
to impose a financial penalty on the government for failing to devise a timely 
plan.299 Thus, even if they did not have the political clout to move the process 
along, this leverage provided at least a more consequential voice because it 
exacted a financial penalty on the government for delaying the owners' 
personally beneficial use (building on their lots and enjoying the lake for 
themselves).300 Similarly, they could have financially benefited from developing 
their lot and enjoying the lucrative advantage of improving the value of the parcel 
and creating an economic opportunity for themselves. 
The majority opinion explained that a temporary moratorium is neither a 
taking nor not-a-taking. The answer would depend on the particular 
circumstances of the case.30l The opinion then corralled the categorical rules 
from Lucas. 302 Physical occupation cases are not precedent for evaluating a 
claim of a regulatory taking.303 The Court seemed to imply that regulatory 
takings do not therefore represent as great an affront to individual property rights. 
While a categorical rule might be appropriate for a physical occupation, in the 
regulatory taking context, the categorical rule will only apply when there has 
296. Lucas v. S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
297. First English Evangelical Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
298. See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. 302. 
299. ld. at 310-12. 
300. See id. Interestingly, this was one of the arguments advanced but never granted any 
cognizance by the Court. 
301. ld. at 331. 
302. The examples offered by the majority opinion illustrate that the physical part of takings 
law does not make much sense because what is physical? Is the physicality the source of the 
purported harm or is it the magnitude of the impact of the regulation that is the source of the harm? 
See id. at 330 (explaining the Lucas rule based on "extraordinary circumstances") (citing Lucas v. 
S.c. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992)). 
303. ld. at 322. Physical takings are still at the takings end of the continuum and categorically 
require compensation. "When the government physically takes possession of an interest in property 
for some public purpose, it has a categorical duty to compensate the former owner regardless of 
whether the interest that is taken constitutes the entire parcel or merely a part thereof." ld. (citation 
omitted) 
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been permanent obliteration of the value of a fee simple estate. This must be an 
obliteration of 100% of the value of the parcel; a mere 95% would not be enough 
of a diminution to justify categorical treatment?04 Instead, the operative default 
rule for determining when a regulatory taking has occurred requires a fact-
specific inquiry.305 The matter turns on whether the issue presents a question of 
whether there is an interest in protecting individual property owners from bearing 
public burdens, "which in all fairness and justice should be borne by the public 
as a whole.,,306 This statement brings us full circle to the purpose of the taking 
inquiry--<ietermining when it is unfair as a matter of property rights to single out 
certain property owners from an Equal Protection perspective guided by a 
substantive Due Process assessment of fairness. The anti-subordination rationale 
is clear; it looks to the impact of the deprivation as compared to others and 
assesses its fairness. 
Similar to Lingle's determination to rescue Nollan and Dolan, perhaps the 
weakest aspect of Tahoe-Sierra is that it affirms the validity of the Lucas Court's 
finding a permanent deprivation of all value when, in reality, Mr. Lucas did not 
suffer a permanent depri vation of all value.307 The regulation was not permanent. 
Without permanence, the permanent deprivation of value did not actually occur. 
Yet the Lucas case precipitated a categorical rule stating that there was a 
permanentdeprivation.308 The petitioners' arguments in Tahoe-Sierra for similar 
categorical treatment make sense as long as Lucas is retained as good law. Why 
did Tahoe-Sierra decline to follow the absolutist language and reasoning of 
Lucas and First English? The primary reason is that the rules announced, 
notwithstanding their emotionally gratifying categorical protections from the 
excess of government interference with private property rights, were 
unadministrable. Regulatory takings cases are really about fairness rather than 
any bedrock coherent right of property. Within the constraining rubric of 
property rights, the taking principle admits of no limit-government regulation 
necessarily diminishes the free use of property. While the reciprocity of 
advantage rationale in Penn Central is appealing to some, to others that approach 
to protection of property rights is too diffuse and indirect. On the other hand, the 
absolutist vision of regulatory takings admits of no limits, and any attempt to 
signal limits results in rules that are difficult, if not impossible, to apply 
consistently. 
One might conclude that the Penn Central standard re-invoked in Tahoe-
Sierra means that local governments need not worry about regulatory takings 
claims. Instead, notwithstanding Lucas's banishment to the margins of 
regulatory takings jurisprudence, it is significant that Lucas was not overruled.309 
304. See id. at 330 (citing Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1019 n.S (noting that the categorical rule does 
not apply to diminutions in value of 95%». 
305. [d. at 332. 
306. [d. at 321 (quoting Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960». 
307. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1020 (discussing limits on Mr. Lucas's land). 
30S. See id. at 1017. 
309. The same can be said of Nollan's and Dolan's similar, yet less convincing, banishment 
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The Court backed away from the unadministrability of categorical rules, but the 
cumulative effect of the past twenty years of regulatory takings jurisprudence 
cautions local governments. The decision still serves the practical purpose of 
signaling the theoretical limit to governmental action. It warns government that 
regulations should not be permanent when they can be made temporary. While 
this suggests that the government need only put an expiration or sunset date on 
a regulation to remove it from Lucas's purview, it still lays out a theoretical limit 
that puts government on notice of situations in which governmentaljustifications 
will be irrelevant, average reciprocity of advantage arguments will be unavailing, 
and the impact on the property owners will trump the public interest. 
Also, the categorical rules still lurk, perhaps not to be reinstated in their full 
form, but still threatening enough to be partially resurrected if the local 
government's actions shock the conscience of the property-rights-minded 
judge.310 Therefore, local governments are on notice to proceed carefully in 
managing suburban development and should consider compensating in advance, 
whenever possible, or providing a quid pro quo to forestall the next unpredictable 
set of takings arguments. 
ill. CRITICAL ANTI-SUBORDINATION LESSONS FOR THE 
WELL-CONSIDERED PLAN: TOWARD A MEANINGFUL STANDARD 
Acknowledging the underlying reality of regulatory takings, anti-
subordination concerns serve two purposes. First, they focus attention on harms 
that may not be directly cognizable under traditional Equal Protection or Due 
Process doctrine. Second, and more importantly, they allow a move past the 
strictures of property rights language typically used to challenge exercises of 
eminent domain. This expands the eminent domain discussion to acknowledge 
the complexity of interests at play in disagreements over development. The 
context for redevelopment suggests that globalization is driving the subordination 
inherent in redevelopment as well as simultaneously strengthening the need for 
local economic development.31l As Margit Mayer observes, cities are trying to 
remake themselves to keep up with international competition; the higher up they 
are in the chain of global cities, the more imperative it is that they provide 
advanced services and the more intense the restructuring of urban space. 312 
"Local political actors everywhere emphasize economic innovation, seek 
to the margins of regulatory takings jurisprudence as mere land exactions that wreak 
unconstitutional conditions. The banishment cannot negate the implied recognition of inequality 
of bargaining power as a motivation for this doctrinal detour. Moreover, it fully supports the 
Court's loud signal to local governments about a categorical definition of unfairness that they 
should take care to avoid. See, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 n.6 (1994). 
310. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014-16 (discussing the categorical rule of compensating 
for regulatory takings). 
311. See supra Part I.A-B. 
312. Margit Mayer, Urban Social Movements in an Era of Globalisation, in URBAN 
MOVEMENTS IN A GlOBAUSING WORm 141, 143 (Pierre Hamel et al. eds., 2000). 
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entrepreneurial culture, and implement labour market flexibility in order to 
counter the crisis of Fordism and to meet intensified international competition. 
Other policy areas are increasingly subordinated to these economic priorities."313 
Thus, the globalization imperative is real. But this imperative also structures 
redevelopment in a way that certain types of people who live in certain types of 
places are left without a voice and without recourse in redevelopment. This 
expanded vision of regulatory takings doctrine here invites us to see those 
individuals, subordinated by redevelopment, as having a property-like interest in 
not being denied their effective voice in the fate of their homes, small businesses, 
and desire to live in their community. Regulatory takings doctrine illustrates that 
the Court is willing to respond to a perceived subordination in the suburban 
context The language of property rights is individualistic, categorical, 
inadequate to the task of community, and ambiguous about the rights and 
interests harmed by redevelopment. A new conception of the harms and interests 
at stake is necessary to acknowledge how community interests should be 
considered. Once we drop the blinders obscuring property rights, it will be 
possible to see how regulatory takings anti-subordination underpinnings 
recognize that property is constitutive of identity and that local governments are 
attempting to create a new identity for their cities.314 The categorical approach 
of declaring some takings invalid because they involve "economic development" 
while retaining the blight exception would still leave the very same 
neighborhoods subordinated by redevelopment disproportionately affected. 
These neighborhoods would continue to be burdened by a privatized public 
decision-making process that is properly characterized as a political process 
failure. 
Land use and eminent domain doctrine invests local government with the 
power to determine or resolve the outcomes of these conflicting interests by 
investing government with the sole power or title of community. This sovereign 
view of government looks only to the formal powers of government and the 
content of these laws, but barely looks to the execution of these powers.315 One 
approach might be to suggest local community institutions that would better 
represent community interests in the redevelopment decision-making process. 
The difficulty is that there is no unitary community; instead, there are cleavages 
in interests that lead to conflict when brought together.316 Forming new local 
institutions is not the answer because this only results in more fragmentation. 
According to Crowley, "[P]luralists tend to overlook the structural imbalance in 
organizational capacity between elites who set agendas and other stakeholders 
313. /d. (citing POST FORDISM: A READER (Ash Amin ed., 1994)). 
314. See generally Elizabeth Blackmar, Appropriating "the Commons": The Tragedy of 
Property Rights Discourse, in THE POUTICS OF PUBUC SPACE 49 (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds., 
2006). 
315. But see Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65 (2000) (per curiam) 
(permitting a plaintiff "class of one" to bring an equal protection claim against the village in regards 
to an easement the City demanded from the plaintiff). 
316. CROWlEY, supra note 183, at 18-19. 
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wishing to challenge those agendas."317 Thus, Crowley recommends 
"[ c ]ontentious collective action [a]s an alternative mode of participation for areas 
lacking regular access to government officials."318 It is helpful, then, to focus on 
two structural variables: 1) the "structure of political opportunities"319 (the threat 
of disruption), and 2) "mobilizing structures.,,320 These suggestions refer to both 
material, as well as social and structural, resources. Crowley also notes that 
"[n]ational and local federated organizations have been decisive in the outcomes 
of contention because of their independence from" what has been referred to as 
the pro-growth coalition. 321 "Community organizations that depend heavily upon 
urban growth coalitions for operating resources are not likely to take the lead in 
challenging unwanted growth and redevelopment agendas because they might 
risk alienating their supporters and losing access to valuable resources."322 
Another key issue facing community institutions is the problem of 
informality in the redevelopment process. So many aspects of transactions are 
negotiated behind closed doors and are based on interpersonal relations. As 
Patience Crowder observes, the need for informality in deal-making is in 
potentially irresolvable tension with the public's need for transparency and 
information.323 This reinforces the reality that there is a political process failure 
in redevelopment. The lesson of critical race theory is that the Court must gently 
steer this political process by sending a substantive message of fairness and 
reasonableness countering subordination in redevelopment. This is accomplished 
by establishing substantive standards of inclusion that cities must adhere to in 
legislating and executing redevelopment projects. 
In certain respects, the Court began to make this "political" intervention in 
eminent domain doctrine by conditioning the validity of the exercise of eminent 
domain on a well-considered development plan. With the well-considered plan 
offered as safeguard, it only makes sense to define standards for what is "well-
considered." This is similar to the results of the means-ends connections 
317. Id.atI2. 
318. Id. at 17. 
319. Id. at 20 (quoting Peter K. Eisenger, The Conditions of Protest Behavior in American 
Cities, 67 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 11-25 (1973)). 
320. See Doug McAdam et al., Introduction, in COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS 2-4 (McAdam et al. eds., 1996). 
Id. 
321. CROWLEY, supra note 183, at 22. 
322. Id. Crowley elaborates on "mobilizing structures" noting, 
The phrase "mobilizing structures" refers to resources that challengers can access and 
convert into vehicles for mounting and sustaining collective actions. Examples ... 
include money, communications media, and meeting places, but also social structures 
such as family units, friendship networks, voluntary groups, work units, businesses, 
professional organizations, and government agencies that can facilitate resource 
mobilization. 
323. See Crowder, supra note 182, at 658 ("Informality in redevelopment clouds transparency 
and prevents the achievement of [the] public policy [of getting information to the public]."). 
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required in Nollan and Dolan; the connection between a regulation's means and 
ends must now be justified with expert studies to provide factual support for the 
regulation. In the context of the "well-considered" plan, however, instead of 
using the means-ends match standard, the Court should actually focus on defining 
the "ends." Here, "well-considered" should be backed by bringing to the table 
the stakeholders and visionaries of urban living. We are facing enormous 
decisions about the future of our cities, and cities are unduly influenced by 
upscale private structural pressures of globalization, narrow-mindedness, copycat 
approaches, and investment pressures for quick returns. Ratifying plans created 
under this globalized context as "well-considered" without defining standards 
results in a political choice that favors the status quo. It also ratifies the worst of 
what is seriously wrong with current local economic development practices. 
The difficult issue is that local governments seem to need no prompting to 
seek out informal relations with business elites. Thus, how can we systematically 
encourage local government to reach out to others in the community? What legal 
carrots-and-sticks can one provide to make it in their interest to seek out 
community? A starting point is to define substantive anti-subordination 
standards for the "well-considered" plan. The plans underlying eminent domain 
can reflect gut-felt fairness principles of inclusion and responsiveness to 
community perspectives. More specifically, this will require participatory 
institutional structures that provide training and resources to enable citizen 
participation in plan formulation.324 
This lengthy discussion on regulatory takings suggests an argument for a 
heightened standard of review. But actually, as much I would like to develop 
such an argument, I have not seen, nor have I been able to come up with, a 
principled basis upon which to draw the line between proper and improper 
purposes. Proponents of a closer means-ends match usually throw a doctrinal 
wrench in the development process that may not be proportionate to the 
particular harm or impact of the redevelopment.325 The convergence of critical 
race theory and regulatory takings anti-subordination concerns looks to the 
context of a government decision and acknowledges the defects in the political 
process that hamper individual property owners or residents of certain types of 
324. See generally JAMES L. CREIGHrON, THE PUBliC PARTICIPATION HANDBOOK: MAKING 
BEITER DECISIONS THROUGH CITIZEN lNvOL VEMENT (2005). Creighton notes, 'This book shows 
how to design and conduct a public participation from beginning to end." [d. at 5. For additional 
resources on citizen participation, see HENRY SANOFF, COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION METHODS IN 
DESIGN AND PLANNING 6 (2000) (describing Nos Quedamos involvement ofimpoverished residents 
in urban renewal at Melrose Commons); Emil E. Malizia, Structuring Urban Redevelopment 
Projects: Moving Participants up the Learning Curve, 25 J. REALEsT. REs. 463, 473-76 (2003) 
(providing ideas for attempting to communicate lenders' expectations to community). 
325. See, e.g., Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Public-Use Question as a Takings Problem, 71 GEO. 
WASH. L. REv. 934, 969 (2003) (arguing for a reasonable necessity standard of review for the 
public-use clause to demand factual justification for land transfers and require the government to 
justify how it chooses to acquire property). 
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communities from protecting their interests.326 What regulatory takings doctrine 
provides is the example of specific expressions of judicial guidance on a roadmap 
of concerns that local government must consider. Critical race theory provides 
an explicit, unapologetic acknowledgment that these disagreements about 
development are political. Thus, perhaps the fix to what is so unsatisfying about 
the Kelo majority opinion comes from focusing on the politics of the 
redevelopment process and providing a hopefully ameliorating antidote to the 
current state of political process failure. 327 As John Hart Ely observes: 
The Constitution has instead proceeded from the quite sensible 
assumption that an effective majority will not inordinately threaten its 
own rights, and has sought to assure that such a majority not 
systematically treat others less well than it treats itself-by structuring 
decision processes at all levels to try to ensure, first, that everyone's 
interests will be ... represented ... at the point of substantive decision, 
and second, that the . . . application will not be manipulated so as to 
reintroduce in practice the sort of discrimination that is impermissible in 
theory.328 
326. The divergences are also potentially, although not necessarily, quite clear. For example, 
it might seem that regulatory takings is solely concerned with property owners. Justice Thomas's 
unique expression of concern for the systematic disadvantages to certain communities, for instance, 
arises because he can see disadvantage (racial and class) as it affects the property owner. See supra 
notes 90-94 and accompanying text. Yet, other types of residents, namely tenants, can also be 
included under the regulatory takings umbrella because strong protections of property rights 
necessarily involve "conceptual severance." See Margaret Jane Radin, The Liberal Conception of 
Property: Cross-Currents in the Jurisprudence of Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1667, 1676 (1988) 
(discussing conceptual severance). Tenants are the owners of strands of property rights. Thus, 
tenants should be protectible under the regulatory takings property rights umbrella as well. 
327. For other approaches to the role of the political process in redevelopment, see Brief for 
the American Planning Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, Kelo v. City 
of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (No. 04-108), 2005 WL 166929, at *25-26 ("Another source 
of protection for all property owners is to assure, to the extent possible, that eminent domain is 
exercised only in conjunction with a process of land use planning that includes broad public 
participation and a careful consideration of alternatives to eminent domain."); Paul Boudreaux, 
Eminent Domain, Property Rights, and the Solution of Representation Reinforcement, 83 DENY. 
U. L. REv. 1, 1 (2005) (proposing "eminent domain be constitutionally impermissible when it is 
both used to take land destined for private hands and disproportionately hurts the poor or politically 
disadvantaged"); Elisabeth Sperow, The Kelo Legacy: Political Accountability, Not Legislation, 
Is the Cure, 38 MCGEORGE L. REV. 405, 426-27 (2007) (discussing participation in the political 
process and negotiation with politicians as the appropriate response to Kelo); see generally Joseph 
William Singer, The Ownership Society and Takings of Property: Castles, Investments, and Just 
Obligations, 30 HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 309 (2006) (advocating a citizenship model of property 
rights to create a fairness-based framework for analyzing regulatory takings). 
328. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 100-01 
(1980). 
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That political process is currently subsumed within the carefully considered 
redevelopment plan that Kelo says will ratify an exercise of eminent domain. 329 
As currently formulated, the Court affirmed a top-down planning process 
developed by the state.330 The reality is that within the field of urban planning, 
a plan has legitimacy not because of authority granted from the state and the 
convening or several meetings to merely inform residents.331 For example, an 
international organization, the International Association for Public Participation 
(IAP2), has developed core values for public participation.332 
The planning process involves certain inclusive procedural components. It 
is supposed to directly involve residents in articulating the needs for the area and 
envisioning future development, thereby receiving an opportunity to ensure that 
their needs are met by the resulting development.333 Concededly, this last point 
means both a procedural component to planning as well as a substantive 
329. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 478 (2005). 
330. See generally id. 
331. See generally Nicole Stelle Garnett, Planning as Public Use, 34 ECOLOGYL.Q. 443, 461-
68 (2007) (arguing that land use planning is inadequate to limit pretextual takings or lead to more 
successful projects). 
332. The IAP2 website states: 
As an international leader in public participation, IAP2 has developed the "IAP2 Core 
Values for Public Participation" for use in the development and implementation of 
public participation processes. These core values were developed over a two-year 
period with broad international input to identify those aspects of public participation 
which cross national, cultural, and religious boundaries. The purpose of these core 
values is to help make better decisions which reflect the interests and concerns of 
potentially affected people and entities. 
International Association for Public Participation, IAP2 Core Values, http://www.iap2.orgl 
displaycommon.cfm?an=4 (last visited Mar. 12,2009). 
333. See id. "IAP2 Core Values for the Practice of Public Participation: 
1. Public participation is based on the belief that those who are affected by a decision 
have a right to be involved in the decision-making process. 
2. Public participation includes the promise that the public's contribution will 
influence the decision. 
3. Public participation promotes sustainable decisions by recognizing and 
communicating the needs and interests of all participants, including decision-
makers. 
4. Public participation seeks out and facilitates the involvement of those potentially 
affected by or interested in a decision. 
5. Public participation seeks input from participants in designing how they 
participate. 
6. Public participation provides participants with the information they need to 
participate in a meaningful way. 
7. Public participation communicates to participants how their input affected the 
decision. 
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component; it suggests that a plan involving the residents that is carefully 
considered will yield a substantive result that ensures that their needs are 
considered in the plan. Thus, it is not possible to avoid some normative view of 
the proper substance of a redevelopment plan when competing needs are so great. 
On the other hand, the appeal of strengthening the carefully considered plan is 
limited-the disadvantages to existing residents in the political process are still 
present. Yet, Professor Ann Carlson and Daniel Pollak's study has shown in the 
regulatory takings setting that the doctrine, even with its pro-government 
deferential standard, has impacted the way that local government officials make 
land use decisions.334 Similarly, it would probably take very little for the 
Supreme Court to impact eminent domain redevelopment decisionmaking by 
clarifying the standard for what a carefully considered plan by rights should look 
like. 
The state of the planning literature today suggests that planning both is and 
is not the answer.335 The planning field is in flux. It has promised too much, and 
its practitioners and theorists are never politically placed to have a very 
significant role in actual planning. They have been either brought in as 
procedural facilitators or advocates, but not as part of imagining what will 
actually take place. Thus, just as the problem of redevelopment is complex, the 
solutions are equally complex. The role of the Supreme Court is to remedy the 
political process failure and not place a finger on the balance of a political 
process that is unduly weighted in favor of the types of redevelopment we see.336 
We cannot assume that in this arena, however, the States are making the best 
decisions. The disaster of urban renewal proves as much. In addition, the 
Supreme Court cannot substitute its judgment for what is a good project. To the 
extent, however, that the Court conditions eminent domain on a carefully 
considered plan-the plan that is truly well-considered in fact, not just 
theory---can be easily infused with some broad but substantive teeth. 
Specifically, the Court could require that the plan endorse actual planning and 
inclusion in the process and the substance of the outcome. This point echoes the 
Kelo dissents trying to use public ownership or public access as the measure; 
instead, I focus on process because it allows greater flexibility and more directly 
acknowledges its political nature. The lessons of regulatory takings doctrine are 
that the Supreme Court should intervene in defining standards where there is 
political process failure due to unequal bargaining power. Conceptual severance 
334. See Carlson & Pollak, supra note 16, at 116-17. 
335. See Robert Fishman, The Fifth Migration, 71 J. AM. PLAN. ASS'N, 357, 358 (2005) 
(arguing that the United States is in the early stages of another great "migration" of population 
identified by Lewis Mumford in a classic 1925 article as largely shaping America). 
336. Peter Marcuse, The Politics of Public Space; The Right to the City: Social Justice and 
the Fight for Public Space, 73.1 J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N 125 (2007) (reviewing both THE POUTICS 
OF PUBUC SPACE (Setha Low & Neil Smith eds., 2006) and DON MITCHElL, THE RIGlIT TO THE 
CITY: SOCIAL JUSTICE AND THE FIGlIT fUR PUBuc SPACE (2003» ("Public space can be used to 
limit democracy as well as further it. And Harvey links the use of public space to discussions of 
the right to the city."). 
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allows the cognizance of different types of property owners-residential and 
commercial, owners and renters. 
CONCLUSION 
Not all property owners are wealthy and politically powerful. Not all of the 
poor are without political power or social capital. Nevertheless, it is the case that 
in the redevelopment context, the nature of the development imperatives, 
described at length above, work to the exclusion of the existing residents through 
privatized decision-making processes that ironically are used to justify the 
"publicness" of the redevelopment plan. The Supreme Court's decision in Kelo 
is understandable for its reluctance to intervene in legislative decisionmaking 
about valid and invalid purposes. The decision has the inadvertent effect, 
however, of placing a hand on the balance of urban redevelopment, to the 
unacknowledged detriment of residents, property owners, and small business 
people. In light of the ever-increasing imperatives towards economic 
development from globalization-with cities viewing their interests as 
consistently aligned with national developers, corporations, and retailers-the 
consistent winners and losers in that redevelopment game should not be ignored. 
We cannot presume that because development is state-sponsored the interests of 
the public or of the residents of the proposed redevelopment will be appropriately 
considered. Both regulatory takings and critical race theory provide the language 
and the logic of anti-subordination provides a way to acknowledge the 
subordination. The Court has a responsibility to ensure that the eminent domain 
doctrine encourages a meaningful process and substantive standards that secures 
the interests of all who are present and subjected to a proposed redevelopment 
scheme. 
